B. Use of Prior Inconsistent Statement
The State may offer an inconsistent statement, made
by defendant at the time of his arrest, to rebut the alibi
which defendant presents at trial. State v. Deatore, 70 N.J.
100 (1976). The State may use the alibi notice in cross-
examination as a prior inconsistent statement where
defendant testifies. State v. Irving, 114 N.J. 427 (1989).
However, if a defendant does not testify, the State may
not refer to defendant’s alibi notice or comment on
defendant’s failure to produce any of the witnesses named
therein. Irving, supra; State v. Lumumba, 253 N.J. Super.
375 (App. Div. 1992); State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 92
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 194 (1987).
V. EVIDENCE
It is clear that a State’s investigator cannot testify as
to the fact of conversations with persons not listed as alibi
witnesses and not called as witnesses by either party in
order to raise the inference that they would negate
defendant’s alibi. State v. Robinson, 139 N.J. Super. 58
(App. Div. 1976), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 534 (1977).
Evidence, such as a diary, is not admissible for the
purpose of bolstering the credibility of an alibi witness’
testimony regarding defendant’s whereabouts on the day
of the crime. State v. Spano, 69 N.J. 231 (1976).
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A model jury charge for alibi does exist and should be
given, even though older case law suggests that an alibi
charge is not specially required. Model Criminal Jury
Charges, Alibi (5/19/97); see State v. Edge, 57 N.J. 580
(1971); State v. Garvin, 44 N.J. 268 (1965).
VII. BIFURCATED TRIAL
A bifurcated trial is not required where defendant
voluntarily raises inconsistent defenses, such as alibi and
insanity. State v. Haseen, 191 N.J. Super. 564 (App. Div.
1983).
ANTITRUSTANTITRUSTANTITRUSTANTITRUSTANTITRUST
I. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The substantive provisions of the New Jersey
Antitrust Act, N.J.S.A. 56:9-1, et seq., are patterned after
those of the federal antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.
(the Sherman Antitrust Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 12, et seq.
(the Clayton Antitrust Act). See Bruce D. Greenberg and
Gary K. Wolinetz, 25 Years of The New Jersey Antitrust Act,
26 Seton Hall L. Rev. 637 (1996). The more significant
provisions of the Act are as follows:Section 3. Prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination...or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce in this State...” See, 15 U.S.C. § 1.Section 4. Prohibits monopolization, attempts to
monopolize and combinations or conspiracies to
monopolize any relevant market within this State. See, 15
U.S.C. § 2. This section also prohibits stock acquisitions
or mergers whenever the effect thereof “may be to
substantially lessen competition within this State...or to
restrain such commerce in any section or community of
this State, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce within this State.” See, 15 U.S.C. § 18.Section 5. Provides exemptions for various regulated
industries and other organizations and activities.Section 6. Defines the duty of the Attorney General
to investigate and prosecute violations of the Act.Sections 7 & 8. Authorizes the Attorney General to
seek the revocation or suspension of corporate charter
rights of a domestic corporation (§7) or suspension of the
right of a foreign corporation to do business within this
State (§ 8) for violations of the Act.Section 9. Confers administrative subpoena power on
the Attorney General or his designee and authorizes the
Attorney General to compel testimony and confer use
immunity.Section 10. Provides for mandatory and prohibitory
injunctive relief for violations of the Act and allows the
recovery of costs and attorneys fees to a successful
plaintiff. See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 25 and 26. It also allows the
Attorney General to recover civil penalties.Section 11. Provides criminal penalties for knowing
violations of the Act. By amendment effective April 18,