2000, any violation “involving or affecting trade or
commerce of a value” less than $1,000,000 is a crime of
the third degree. If the affected commerce is valued
greater than $1,000,000, it is a crime of the second
degree. Bid rigging of public contracts is a crime of the
second degree, regardless of the value of commerce
involved. The section also provides for enhanced fines.
Section 12. Allows any person injured in his
“business or property” to recover treble damages plus
costs and attorneys fees. See, 15 U.S.C. § 15. The State
and its subdivisions are persons within the meaning of
this section.
Section 13. Final judgments in civil or criminal
proceedings brought by the State, except for damage
actions filed by the State under § 12, constitute prima
facie evidence against the defendants in any action
brought by any other party for the same violation. See, 15
U.S.C. § 16(a).
Section 14. Provides a four year statute of limitations
running from the date of discovery. See, 15 U.S.C. §
16(I).
Section 15. The running of the statute of limitations
is suspended as to private rights of action during the
pendency of any action brought by the State, except one
for treble damages, and for a period of one year thereafter.
See, 15 U.S.C. § 16(I).
Section 18. The “act shall be construed in harmony
with judicial interpretations of comparable federal
antitrust statutes...”
Section 19. This section creates a revolving fund to
pay the Attorney General’s cost of enforcing the Act.
II. CRIMINAL CASES
In State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Assn., 96 N.J. 8
(1985), fifty seven individuals and companies were
indicted for a conspiracy in restraint of trade to enforce so-
called “property rights.” Property rights were a form of
horizontal market allocation, that is, the exclusive right to
provide garbage collection services at a particular location
free from competition from other collectors. Three of the
defendants were reputed organized crime figures who
had engaged in an extortionate scheme in order to force
a garbage collector to sell his business to a party of their
choosing. The indictment alleged this to be part of the
conspiracy in restraint of trade. The trial court dismissed
the indictment as to the three on the ground that it was
duplicitous.After reviewing the “totality of the circumstances,”
the Supreme Court in Trade Waste found the extortionate
scheme to be a part of the conspiracy in restraint of trade.
The Court further held that: (1) a conspiracy in restraint
of trade offense is made out by proof of the offending
agreement; no overt acts need to be proven or alleged; (2)
a “rule of reason” violation requires proof of both intent
and agreement, whereas a per se violation only requires
proof of agreement; (3) the fact that these defendants did
not engage in the garbage business and thus were not
competitors of the other conspirators was irrelevant; (4)
the fact that the extortionate scheme might have been
separately indicted did not make the indictment
duplicitous where it is shown that under the “totality of
the circumstances” test this scheme was part of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy in restraint of trade; (5) the
factors considered under the “totality of the
circumstances” test include the degree of interdepen-
dence required by the overall scheme, the extent to which
the allegedly separate acts shared common goals, the time
periods involved, the location of the acts, commonality of
operating methods, and the number of overt acts which
are common to both schemes; and (6) a person is guilty
of an offense under N.J.S.A. 56:9-11 if he is shown to have
either knowingly entered into the prohibited agreement
or that he knowingly aided and advised in such
agreement.The defendant in State v. Lawn King, 84 N.J. 179
(1980), was a franchiser. The distributors were the
intermediaries between the corporation and its dealers.
The franchise sold by Lawn King to its distributors and
dealers was territorial. The trial court applied the per se
rule and found the defendant guilty of illegal restraints of
trade. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction.
The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the state
Antitrust Act is not pre-empted by federal antitrust
enactments, but should be interpreted in accordance
with federal precedents. The Court further ruled that
horizontal territorial restraints, bid rigging and vertical
price restraints are per se unlawful. Non-price vertical
restraints ancillary to or an integral part of price fixing
schemes are also per se unlawful. Other non-price vertical
restraints are subject to the rule of reason and are
actionable if the restraint has an adverse effect on
interbrand competition or the restraint lacks any
“redeeming virtues.”Lawn King further held that it is per se unlawful for
a manufacturer or franchiser to participate in or