evidence used to establish the pattern of racketeering
activity. 141 N.J. at 162. Furthermore, while the
enterprise must be shown to have an “organization,” it need
not feature any “ascertainable structure” or structure with a
particular configuration. Id. Rather, “the focus of the
evidence must be on the number of people involved and
their knowledge of the objectives of their association, how
the participants associated with each other, whether the
participants each performed discrete roles in carrying out
the scheme, the level of planning involved, how decisions
were made, the coordination involved in implementing
decisions, and how frequently the group engaged in
incidents or committed acts of racketeering activity, and
the length of time between them.” Id. at 162-63.
An individual cannot be an enterprise and
simultaneously be the person “employed by” or “associated
with” the enterprise. State v. Kuklinski, 234 N.J. Super. 418
(Law Div. 1988).
B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1a provides a lengthy list of crimes
under New Jersey law or equivalent crimes under the laws
of another jurisdiction which could constitute “racketeer-
ing activity.” “Racketeering activity” in New Jersey is also
defined to include any conduct defined as “racketeering
activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A), (B), or (D). A
conspiracy to commit a predicate act of racketeering is itself
a racketeering predicate under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1a. State v.
Bisaccia, 319 N.J. Super. 1, 20 (App. Div. 1999).
The primary criterion of a “pattern of racketeering
activity” is relatedness based upon a broad standard
involving the totality of all relevant circumstances,
including purposes, results, participants, victims, methods,
and other characteristics. State v. Ball, 141 N.J. at 169.
Although “continuity” is not a distinctive subelement of a
pattern, as required under federal law, see H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989),
some degree of continuity, or the threat of continuity, is
required and is inherent in the element of “relatedness.”
State v. Ball, 141 N.J. at 168; see also State v. Taccetta, 301
N.J. Super. 227 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 152 N.J. 187
(1997).
In interpreting the statutory phrase “to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the
enterprise’s affairs” the New Jersey Supreme Court has
rejected federal law, that the defendant must take part in
the “operation” or “management” of the enterprise. See
Rever v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993). Instead, the
Court determined that a defendant may be liable for
racketeering if one knowingly engages in activities that seek
to further, assist, or help effectuate the goals of the
enterprise. State v. Ball, 141 N.J. at 175. Neither the
enterprise nor the predicate racketeering acts are required
to have been motivated by an economic purpose for there
to be RICO liability. National Organization for Women,
Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).III. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT RACKETEER-
ING
To be liable for the crime of conspiracy to commit
racketeering, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2d, one need not agree to
personally commit at least two acts of racketeering; one
must simply agree that he or one or more of his
coconspirators would engage in those acts. State v. Ball,
141 N.J. at 176-81.IV. SENTENCING AND MERGER
Racketeering is a second degree crime, unless the
pattern of racketeering activity involves a crime of violence,
a crime of the first degree, or the use of firearms. N.J.S.A.
2C:41-3a. Not only do the predicate racketeering offenses
not merge into racketeering or conspiracy to commit
racketeering, legislative intent is that the racketeering and
predicate offenses be punished separately and consecu-
tively. State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J. Super. at 257-61; State v.
Ball, 268 N.J. Super. 72, 145-50 (App. Div. 1993), aff’d
o.g., 141 N.J. 142 (1995), cert. denied sub. nom., Mocco v.
New Jersey, 516 U.S. 1075 (1996).An extortion committed under a threat of bodily harm
is a crime of violence and therefore subjects a defendant to
a first degree racketeering sentence if committed as part of
a pattern of racketeering activity. State v. Taccetta, 301 N.J.
Super. at 255-57.Because racketeering is a crime independent of the
commission of the underlying offenses, a state prosecution
for a predicate act is not barred by N.J.S.A. 2C:1-11a(1) by
virtue of a federal RICO prosecution involving that same
act as one of the predicates. State v. Cooper, 211 N.J. Super.
1 (App. Div.).