19 (App. Div. 1995) (police observed drug transaction and
then defendant fled; stop not based solely on flight); State
in the Interest of J.B., 284 N.J. Super. 513, 518-29 (App.
Div. 1995) (juvenile’s flight upon officer’s approach
during planned sweep in high drug trafficking area).
When the police seize an object which looks
intrinsically innocent, its configuration and design do not
“proclaim” its contents and its contents are not visible, to
find probable cause to believe that the contents are
criminal, the police officer must explain why, in light of his
or her training and expertise, he or she believed the
container contained contraband and that explanation must
persuade an average, reasonably prudent person. State v.
Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 383 (1991);
II. WARRANT SEARCHES
The preferred method for conducting a search is with
a search warrant. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 217, 221
(1990) (police may seize trash bags left for collection for any
reason but to search the trash the police must obtain a
search warrant). A search warrant is presumed valid. It
must be supported by probable cause which has been
defined as a flexible, nontechnical concept which exists
where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s
knowledge and of which he/she has reasonably trustworthy
information are sufficient to lead a person of “reasonable
caution” to conclude that an offense is being or has been
committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-
76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); State v.
Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 120 (1987).
A totality of the circumstances approach is used in
evaluating whether probable cause exists and that finding
depends upon factual contexts “not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Jones, 308 N.J. Super. 15, 29
(App. Div. 1998). Hearsay can be relied upon to provide
probable cause and the facts set forth in the affidavit should
be reviewed in a common sense manner to determine
whether there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76
L.Ed.2d 527; United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109,
89 S.Ct. 741, 745-46, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). A reviewing
court must give due deference to the fact that a fellow
judicial officer has issued a warrant and must regard as
“binding” the decision of the issuing judge that probable
cause was demonstrated unless “there was clearly no
justification for that conclusion.” State v. Kasabucki, 52
N.J. 110, 117 (1968). Where the allegations of an
informant alone are insufficient to support probable cause,
the independent observations of the affiant may
supplement the allegations enough to provide the necessary
probable cause. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 125-26.
Officers searching a person’s car, home or belongings
under the authority of a search warrant are authorized to
use only those investigatory methods and to search only
those places appropriate in light of the scope of the warrant.
State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 195 (1985); State v. Johnston,
257 N.J. Super. 178, 189-90 (App. Div. 1992). The
description of the items in the search warrant must be
sufficiently definite to prevent searches conducted “at the
whim of an officer.” State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. at 196 n.2.
However, the description of items to be seized need be only
as specific as reasonable under the circumstances and in the
context of the items specified and the crime allegedly
committed. The lowered expectation of privacy in an
automobile is a factor bearing upon the reasonableness of a
warrant authorizing a search of the car. Id. at 198.
“Scrupulous exactitude” regarding the items to be
seized is required only in the First Amendment context
where the intent of the warrant is to suppress rather than
seize the documents. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483,
492, 93 S.Ct. 2789, 2794-95, 37 L.Ed. 745 (1973);
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485, 85 S.Ct. 506, 511, 13
L.Ed.2d 431 (1965); State v. Jones, 308 N.J. Super. at 34
(warrant sought to seize defendant’s writings that had
tendency to establish motive, identity and relationship
between defendant and victim).
Generally, the validity of a warrant is judged solely on
the information contained in the four corners of the
affidavit. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. at 128. However,
a defendant must be permitted to challenge the validity of
a search warrant on the ground that false statements were
made in the supporting affidavit. A defendant must make
a “substantial” preliminary showing that false statements
were made deliberately or in reckless disregard for the truth
and must support the allegations by an offer of proof
including reliable statements of witnesses. Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-70, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2680-85,
57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); State v. Marshall III, 148 N.J. 89,
193 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 850 (1997); State v.
Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 568 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
994 (1979); State v. Chaney, 318 N.J. Super. 217, 222
(App. Div. 1999).
Even this showing does not automatically guarantee a
hearing. To obtain a hearing, the defendant must show
that the allegedly false statements were essential to support
a probable cause determination. If there was enough