595 (App. Div. 1994), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 29 (1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 865 (1994) (defendant had no
constitutional right to privacy in the contents of a stolen
car); State v. Arias, 282 N.J. Super. 269, 281 (Law Div.
1992) (no Fourth Amendment rights of defendant violated
when police seized items he left in house which he
burglarized). But see, State v. De La Paz, N.J. Super.
(App. Div. 2001) (New Jersey’s automatic standing
rule provides defendant substantive privacy rights under
state constitution regardless of defendant’s actual privacy
interest in dwelling where search occurred).
C. Choice of Law
When incriminating evidence is seized by federal
agents acting lawfully and then turned over to state
officials, the evidence may be admitted in New Jersey
courts even if the search does not meet the requirements of
New Jersey caselaw. That is because to suppress the
evidence would not deter police misconduct or imperil the
judicial integrity of New Jersey courts. State v. Mollica, 114
N.J. at 354-55; State v. Curry, 109 N.J. 1, 14 (1987)
(evidence that may have been illegally seized by Illinois
police still may be admitted into evidence in New Jersey
trial where State learned of evidence from untainted
source). However, where the relationship between the
federal government and state officials is such to implication
concerns which prompted the State’s more restrictive laws,
such as wiretap laws, then evidence seized by the federal
government and turned over to the State may be
suppressed. State v. Minter, 116 N.J. 269, 283 (1989).
D. Technical Violations
No search or seizure made with a search warrant shall
be deemed unlawful because of technical insufficiencies or
irregularities in the warrant or in the papers or proceedings
to obtain it or in its execution. N.J. Ct. R. 3:5-7(g).
Execution of a warrant 30 minutes before it was authorized
was a technical violation that did not violate defendant’s
rights and did not require suppression of the evidence.
State v. Bickham, 285 N.J. Super. 365, 367 (App. Div.
1995). A police officer who conducted an investigation
outside the territorial boundary of his or her jurisdiction
may have been in technical violation of statute (N.J.S.A.
40A:14-152) but that would not justify suppression of
evidence seized from the defendant because no
constitutional right of defendant was violated. State v.
White, 305 N.J. Super. 322, 327, 332 (App. Div. 1997).
SELF-DEFENSESELF-DEFENSESELF-DEFENSESELF-DEFENSESELF-DEFENSE
I. GENERALLY
Chapter Three of the Penal Code addresses the general
principles of justification, including self-defense. Self-
defense encompasses the use of force in self-protection,
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4; use of force for the protection of other
persons, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-5; and use of force for the
protection in defense of premises of personal property,
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-6.II. BURDEN OF PROOF
A claim of justification is an affirmative defense.
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-1. Defendant has the burden of producing
evidence to raise the issue of self-defense. Once such
evidence is presented, even if it is in the State’s case, the
State must disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Acquittal is required if there remains a reasonable doubt
whether defendant acted in self-defense. See, e.g., State v.
Kelly, 97 N.J. 178 (1984); State v. Gardner, 51 N.J. 444
(1968); State v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77 (1965); State v. Abbott, 36
N.J. 63 (1961); State v. Branch, 301 N.J. Super. 307 (App.
Div. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 155 N.J. 317
(1998); State v. Burks, 208 N.J. Super. 595 (App. Div.
1986); State v. Holmes, 208 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div.
1986); State v. Brown, 131 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div.
1974), aff’d o.b., 66 N.J. 146 (1974).III. USE OF FORCE IN SELF-PROTECTION
A. GenerallyThe use of non-deadly force upon or towards another
person is justifiable when defendant reasonably believes
that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such
other person on the present occasion. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4a.The use of deadly force is only justifiable when
defendant reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
protect himself against death or serious bodily harm.
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4b(2). Deadly force is defined as force used
with the purpose of causing or creating a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily harm. Discharging a firearm will
constitute deadly force, but pointing a firearm will not.
N.J.S.A. 2C:3-11b; see State v. Moore, 158 N.J. 292 (1999);
State v. Harmon, 203 N.J. Super. 216 (App. Div. 1985),
rev’d on other grounds, 104 N.J. 189 (1986).