to R. 3:20, or in arrest of judgment pursuant to R. 3:21-
9, or for a rehearing or to amend or make additional
findings pursuant to R. 1:7-4, but the remaining time
shall begin to run from the disposition date of such
motion; (d) in criminal actions by the insanity of the
defendant, but the time shall begin to run from the date
of the removal of such disability.
The time limits for interlocutory appeals are
discussed in ¶ IV, § A above.
R. 2:9-2 states that the time fixed by the rules of any
proceeding on appeal or certification may not be
extended by consent of the parties, but may be granted
by the court for good cause shown unless otherwise
provided by the rules. The time limits may be accelerated
on the court’s own motion or on motion of a party.
VI. APPEALS BY DEFENDANTS
R. 2:3-2 provides that in any criminal action, any
defendant, the defendant’s legal representative, or other
person aggrieved by the final judgment of conviction
entered by the Superior Court, including a judgment
imposing a suspended sentence, or by an adverse
judgment in a post-conviction proceeding attacking a
conviction or sentence or by an interlocutory order or
judgment of the trial court, may appeal, or where
appropriate, seek leave to appeal.
In the event the defendant dies before or during the
pendency of an appeal, his legal representative may be
substituted as the aggrieved party. Beginning with the
holding in Newark v. Pulverman, 12 N.J. 105 (1953),
which was subsequently codified in R. 2:3-2, New Jersey
provided that in any criminal action after the death of the
defendant an appeal may be prosecuted by the
defendant’s legal representative. In State v. Gartland,
149 N.J. 456 (1997), the Court modified the holding in
Pulverman, explaining that the power to review a criminal
appeal of a dead defendant is rarely exercised. Our courts
will entertain a case that has become moot when the issue
is of significant public importance and is likely to recur.
But this power should be sparingly exercised, and a
conviction should not be set aside unless the record shows
palpably that there has been a fundamental miscarriage
of justice, an error that cut mortally into the substantive
rights of the defendant or impaired his ability to maintain
a defense on the merits. Such caution is required,
according to Gartland, because there is an intrinsic
imbalance since the defendant cannot be retried and the
State is realistically deprived of the opportunity to
vindicate the public interest if the conviction is set aside.
R. 3:8-2 governs representation of joint or multiple
defendants and requires permission of the court. This
rule also applies to appeals. See State v. Bellucci, 87 N.J.
531, 539 (1980) (attorney’s position as an advocate for
his client should not be compromised before, during or
after trial.)Denial of defendant’s suppression motion may be
appealed notwithstanding that judgment is entered
following a plea of guilty. R. 3:5-7(d). Other issues, such
as admissibility of identification and confessions and
other evidence, may be waived by a guilty plea unless
preserved by conditional plea. R. 3:9-3(f). The
prosecutor’s position on conditional pleas should be
explicit to obviate having the appellate court construe
silence as tacit consent. See State v. Matos, 272 N.J. Super.
6 (App. Div. 1996). Conditional pleas in municipal
court are governed by R. 7:6-2(c). See State v. Giordano,
281 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div. 1995). Plea agreements
in municipal cases are also controlled by the Guidelines
and Official Commentary issued by the Supreme Court
which are annexed to the court rules as an Appendix to
Part VII. But see L. 2000, c. 75, adopted June 8, 2000,
amending Title 2B and Title 39.A criminal appeal is subject to dismissal where the
defendant becomes a fugitive. State v. Rogers, 90 N.J. 187
(1982). Rogers cited with approval the Appellate
Division decision in State v. Prince, 140 N.J. Super. 418
(App. Div. 1976). In Prince the Appellate Division
dismissed appeal because defendant was a fugitive. On
application of defendant who was recaptured 19 days
after the dismissal, the Appellate Division denied
reinstatement but the Supreme Court remanded for
hearing on the merits. State v. Prince, 71 N.J. 347
(1976). This result reflects the discretion to reinstate a
dismissed appeal if the defendant surrenders or is
apprehended within a short time of dismissal, and where
there is no prejudice to the State and arguably
meritorious issues alleged by the appellant. In State v.
Canty, 278 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div. 1976), however,
the reviewing court held that defendant’s escape and
fugitive status, making him unavailable for a hearing on
a motion to suppress, did not warrant the sanction of
dismissing the motion with prejudice. The court should
either postpone the hearing and place the case on the
inactive list, or proceed in absentia.VII. APPEALS BY THE STATE
The State is authorized by R. 2:3-1 to appeal or seek
leave to appeal where appropriate in a criminal action (a)
to the Supreme Court from final judgment of the