a jurisdiction that has a judicial system that affords
protections similar to our own. State v. Williams, 309 N.J.
Super. 117, 123-124 (App. Div.), certif. denied 156 N.J.
383 (1998) (Canadian conviction could be used to support
extended term).
XI. PROBATION - N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3 and 2C:45-4
A defendant convicted of any offense may be placed on
probation for a period of up to five years, notwithstanding
the fact that the probationary term may exceed the
statutory maximum sentence for that offense. State v.
Dove, 202 N.J. Super. 540 (Law Div. 1985). But see,
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-2a.
The filing of a petition or complaint by a probation
officer constitutes commencement of the probation
revocation proceeding and tolls the probationary period.
State v. Grabinski, 245 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 1991).
Trial court can order, as a condition of probation,
defendant’s exclusion from casino hotels, provided that the
casino disbarment does not exceed the length of the
probationary term. State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244,
255-259 (App. Div. 1990).
Where a fine was imposed on defendant as a condition
of his three year probationary term, the power to collect the
unpaid portion of the fine did not expire with his probation
and the State could institute summary collection
proceedings under N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2 after the probationary
term ended. State v. Joseph, 238 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div.
1990).
Power to collect restitution did not expire with
termination of probationary term. The restitution order
has a separate existence of its own as part of a criminal
sentence. State v. Kemprowski, 265 N.J. Super. 471, 473-
474 (App. Div. 1993).
A. County Jail Term as Condition of Probation
Custodial portion of probationary sentence can be
served at any time during probationary period. State v.
Postal, 204 N.J. Super. 94 (Law Div. 1985), and it can be
reduced at any time. State v. Robinson, 198 N.J. Super. 602
(Law Div. 1984).
Presumption of non-incarceration is not violated by
imposition of probationary sentence with condition of
county jail sentence (split sentence). State v. Hartye, 105
N.J. 411 (1987); State v. O’Connor, 105 N.J. 399 (1987).
Presumption of incarceration is not satisfied by the
imposition of a probationary sentence with the condition
of a county jail sentence (split sentence). State v. O’Connor,
105 N.J. 399 (1987). See, e.g., State v. Whidby, 204 N.J.
Super. 312 (App. Div. 1985); State v. Kreidler, 211 N.J.
Super. 276 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied 107 N.J. 126
(1987).A defendant is entitled to credit for time he or she was
on parole following the county jail portion of probationary
sentence. A defendant is entitled only to the actual amount
of time he spent in jail and on parole. State v. Rosado, 131
N.J. 423 (1993), aff’g 256 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div.
1992). The credit for time on parole is to be applied against
the aggregate term and does not reduce a statutorily
mandated parole ineligibility term. State v. Mercadante,
299 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied 150
N.J. 26 (1997).XII. SENTENCING ON PROBATION VIOLA-
TIONS
If a probationer has been convicted of a crime, the
violation is conclusively presumed. State v. Williams, 299
N.J.Super. 264, 267 (App. Div. 1997).Violation of probation can be based upon conviction
which is on appeal. If the conviction is subsequently
reversed, defendant can move for relief in the trial court on
the ground that basis for the VOP no longer exists. State v.
Williams, 299 N.J. Super. 264, 274 (App. Div. 1997).When a defendant violates probation several options
are open to the sentencing judge. The judge may continue
probation, require service of any suspended term, or
impose any sentence that could have been meted out
originally on conviction for the underlying sentence. State
v. Wilson, 226 N.J. Super. 271, 275 (App. Div. 1988); State
v. Smith, 226 N.J. Super. 276, 280 (App. Div. 1988). The
sentence imposed after revocation should be viewed as
focusing on the original offense rather than on the violation
of probation as a separate offense. Id.When the court revokes a suspension or probation, it
may impose on the defendant any sentences that might
have been imposed originally for the offense of which he
was convicted. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3b; State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1,
7 n. 4 (1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 888 (1981); State v.
Williams, 299 N.J. Super. at 269-270; State v. Vervin, 241
N.J. Super. 458, 469 (App. Div. 1989), certif. denied 121
N.J. 634 (1990).