Defense counsel’s voluntary absence from the
courtroom during the first 18 minutes of the court’s jury
charge did not entitle defendant to relief from conviction.
State v. Holmes, 157 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1978).
In a case where defendant discharged his lawyer and
then left the courtroom and trial proceeded in defendant’s
absence without any representation, reversible error was
found. State v. Wiggins, 158 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div.
1978).
Defendant has a constitutional right to summation
and can knowingly and voluntarily waive the right. State v.
Viglante, 194 N.J. Super. 560 (Law Div. 1983). Defendant
can also waive opening statement. State v. Williams, 232
N.J. Super. 414 ,418 (App. Div.), certif. denied 117 N.J.
633 (1989).
Defendant has constitutional right to counsel at
motion for new trial after conviction; before determining
that defendant has waived that right, trial court must
conduct “searching inquiry”. State v. Wiggins, 291 N.J.
Super. 441 (App. Div. 1996). Defendant has
constitutional right to counsel at sentencing and
resentencing. State v. Giorgianni, 189 N.J. Super. 220
(App. Div. 1983), certif. denied 94 N.J. 569 (1983). See also
Tully v. Scheu, 607 F.2d 31, 35-36 (3d Cir. 1979). This
longstanding rule is equally applicable to a motion for
modification of a sex offender’s parole ineligibility term.
State v. G.S., 255 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1992).
There is no right to counsel at parole revocation
hearing. State v. Morales, 120 N.J. Super. 197 (App. Div.),
certif. denied 62 N.J. 77 (1972).
An indigent defendant has a right to counsel on direct
appeal, even though there is no constitutional right to an
appeal. State v. Coon, 314 N.J. Super. 426, 434 (App. Div.
1998). See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
Defendant has no constitutional right to counsel at
post-conviction relief proceedings. Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722 (1991). See also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481
U.S. 551 (1987); Wise v. Williams, 982 F.2d 142 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied 508 U.S. 964 (1992).
New Jersey has not followed federal law. Our courts
have held that, even though post-conviction relief
proceedings are solely a creation of the court rules, see R.
3:22-1 et seq., defendant is entitled to an attorney on a first
petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Clark, 260 N.J.
Super. 559 (App. Div. 1992); State v. King, 117 N.J. Super.
109 (App. Div. 1971). In addition, the Appellate Division
has recently found ineffective assistance of post-conviction
relief counsel and remanded for a new proceeding because
post-conviction relief counsel’s representation of defen-
dant “amount[ed] to no representation at all.” State v.
Velez, 329 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2000). See also
State v. Russo, 333 N. J. Super. 119 (App. Div. 2000).Defendant and co-defendants were physically re-
strained in arm and leg chains throughout trial were not
denied a fair trial. The Appellate Division found that
because the trial court was confronted with seven
defendants whose records for violence was remarkable, not
using restraints would have required so many sheriff’s
officers that the message purportedly conveyed by the
restraints, that defendants were dangerous, would have
been the same or worse. No jury charge was requested or
given concerning the restraints, and plain error not found.
State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37 (App. Div. 1997).B. Choice of CounselAn essential element of the right to assistance of
counsel is defendant’s right to retain counsel of his or her
own choice. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).The right to counsel of one’s own choosing, however,
is not absolute, and cannot be insisted upon in a manner
that will obstruct an orderly disposition of cases on the
court’s docket nor deprive the court of its inherent power
to control its docket. State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super.
242, 258 (App. Div.), certif. denied 156 N.J. 381 (1998);
State v. Ferguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 401 (App. Div.),
certif. denied 101 N.J. 266 (1985).A defendant who wants to exercise the right to proceed
with counsel he or she chooses must do so with reasonable
diligence. State v. McCombs, 171 N.J. Super. 161, 165
(App. Div. 1978), certif. denied 81 N.J. 373 (1979). If
defendant fails to act expeditiously, the trial court has the
power “to do what is reasonably necessary to meet the
situation.” State v. Reddy, 137 N.J. Super. 32, 35-36 (App.
Div. 1985); State v. Yormark, 117 N.J. Super. 315, 340
(App. Div. 1971), mod. in part on o.g. State v. Mulvaney, 61
N.J. 202, certif. denied 409 U.S. 862 (1972).Defendant’s right to counsel does not extend to the
appointment of counsel of choice, or to a special rapport,
confidence, or even a meaningful relationship with
appointed counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct.
1610, 1617-18 (1983).