B. The Four Factor Test for Determining Whether the
Right to a Speedy Trial Has Been Violated
The United States Supreme Court employs a flexible
balancing test to adjudicate alleged violations of the Sixth
Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. See Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972). The test is applied on an ad hoc
basis, and requires the consideration and weighing of the
following four factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the
reasons for the delay; (3) whether and how defendant
asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the amount of
prejudice to defendant by the delay. Id. at 530.
The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Barker
v. Wingo test in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196 (1976), certif.
denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976). See State v. Long, 119 N.J.
439 (1990).
The list of Barker factors is not intended to be
exhaustive, but only illustrative of the type of
considerations that are relevant to the merits of a speedy
trial claim. As the United States Supreme Court
explained in Barker, “We regard none of the four factors
... as either a necessary or sufficient condition of the right
of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must
be considered together with such other circumstances as
may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic
qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process.” Id. at 533.
C. First Factor: Length of the Delay
The length of delay is, to some extent, a triggering
mechanism. Unless there is some delay which is
presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530.
As the United States Supreme Court announced in
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992): “Simply to
trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that
the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the
threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively
prejudicial’ delay, since, by definition, he cannot
complain that the government has denied him a ‘speedy’
trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his case with customary
promptness. If the accused makes this showing, the court
must then consider, as one factor among several, the
extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare
minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the
claim. This latter inquiry is significant to the speedy trial
analysis because ... the presumption that pretrial delay
has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time.” Id. at
651.“Presumptive prejudice,” when used in this
threshold context, simply “marks the point at which
courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the
Barker inquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. at 652,
n.1. Such “presumptive prejudice” cannot alone create a
Sixth Amendment violation but “it is part of the mix of
relevant facts, and its importance increases with the
length of delay.” Id. at 655.Thus, the length of the delay first figures into the
speedy trial equation for purposes of determining
whether it is long enough to trigger inquiry into the other
Barker factors. Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d
Cir. 1993). If the delay is long enough to trigger inquiry,
then it must be considered and weighed in conjunction
with the other factors. Id.The length of the delay that is necessary to trigger an
inquiry into the other factors is dependent upon the
peculiar circumstances of the case. For example, the delay
that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is
considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy
charge. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530-531.See State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div.
1999) (delay of 633 days from issuance of summons for
DWI offenses, which included 13 noncontiguous,
widely-spaced court sessions, was inexcusable and
violated defendant’s right to speedy trial).D. Second Factor: Reasons for DelayClosely related to the length of the delay is the reason
the State assigns to justify the delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. at 531.A deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial in
order to hamper the defense should be weighed heavily
against the State in determining whether defendant has
been denied a speedy trial. Id.However, a more neutral reason for delay, such as
negligence, should be weighted less heavily against the
State, absent “any showing of bad faith or dilatory
purpose.” Id.; Gov. of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813
F.2d 626, 628 (3d Cir. 1987).Furthermore, a valid reason “should serve to justify
appropriate delay.” Id. And a delay that is attributable
to the dilatory actions of a defendant “cut[s] against a