must show that his anxiety extended beyond that which
“is inevitable in a criminal case.” United States v. Dreyer,
533 F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1976). In order to reach that
level, defendant must produce evidence of “psychic
injury.” Id. at 115-116. See also United States v. Loud
Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312 (“The Speedy Trial Clause’s core
concern is impairment of liberty; it does not shield a
suspect or a defendant from every expense or
inconvenience associated with criminal defense”); State v.
Porter, 210 N.J. Super. 383, 395 (App. Div. 1986)
(same).
General allegations that witnesses’ memories have
faded are insufficient to create prejudice, at least absent
extreme delay such as eight and one-half years [as was
present in Doggett v. United States, supra].” Hakeem v.
Beyer, 990 F.2d at 763.
Cases in which courts considered the absence of
lengthy pretrial incarceration in finding insufficient
prejudice: see State v. Szima, 70 N.J. at 202; State v.
Gilliam, 224 N.J. Super. at 765; Gov. of Virgin Islands v.
Pemberton, 813 F.2d at 629-630; Gov. of Virgin Islands
v. Burmingham, 788 F.2d 933, 937 (3d Cir. 1986).
With respect to all its various types, the burden of
showing prejudice lies with the defendant. Hakeem v.
Beyer, 990 F.2d at 760. Moreover, the mere “possibility
of prejudice is not sufficient to support [the] position that
speedy trial rights [are being] violated.” Ibid., citing
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315.
G. Miscellaneous Examples
An unexplained lapse of 22 months between the time
of defendant’s arrest and his subsequent indictment did
not constitute a denial of his right to a speedy trial.
Defendant was not subjected to lengthy pretrial
incarceration, he made no effort to assert his right to a
speedy trial by moving to dismiss the pending complaint,
and he claimed no impairment of his inability to defend.
State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196 (1976).
The 971-day delay from the date of arrest to the date
of trial did not constitute a denial of defendant’s right to
a speedy trial. Defendant filed numerous pretrial
motions, which accounted for most of the delay, and
there was no indication that the prosecution
intentionally delayed the proceedings to gain an unfair,
tactical advantage. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 467-469
(1990).
A five-and-one-half year period separated defendant’s
arrest for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile
and his indictment for her murder. There was nothing
to indicate that defendant’s defense was unduly impaired
by delay. Nor did defendant show that prior to the
indictment, his employment was interrupted, his
finances drained, his associations curtailed, his
reputation impaired. There was no evidence that
defendant or his family and friends were subjected to
anxiety by reason of the threat of prosecution for murder.
Not only that, but the State offered a reasonable
explanation for the delay. Because the victim’s body was
never found, the State had to prove her death by
circumstantial evidence. In order to do this convincingly,
it was necessary to allow time to pass so that a jury could
reasonably infer that she had not merely run away.
Moreover, it was not unreasonable for the State to hope
that more positive evidence would be found before trying
defendant for this ultimate crime. State v. Zarinsky, 143
N.J. Super. 35 (App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 75 N.J. 101
(1977).Delay of defendant’s sentencing for three and one-
half years did not violate Sixth Amendment where the
charge was dismissed post-conviction, the State
appealed, and the appeal was held up for a lengthy period
as a result of significant delays on defendant’s part. As the
Court explained, there was no suggestion of purposeful
stalling by the State; the appellate issues raised by the
State were substantial and resulted in the reinstatement
of defendant’s conviction; defendant never asserted a
speedy trial right; there was no impairment of
defendant’s defense; and there was no cognizable
prejudice to defendant. State v. LeFurge, 222 N.J. Super.
92 (App. Div. 1988).Twenty month delay between defendant’s initial
arrest and final conviction held reasonable, where State
was still gathering evidence of defendant’s criminal
involvements, and where defendant filed motion
demanding speedy trial five months after indictment and
State was ready to proceed to trial 18 days thereafter.
State v. Bryant, 217 N.J. Super. 72 (App. Div.), certif.
denied, 108 N.J. 202, cert. denied 484 U.S. 978 (1987).Five year delay between time of defendant’s
indictment and date of final conviction held reasonable
where defendant failed to assert his right to speedy trial
until four years after indictment, and where defendant’s
own actions were primarily responsible for the delay.
State v. Holmes, 214 N.J. Super. 195 (App. Div. 1986).