determining whether federal judges could suspend
execution of sentence in lights of a provision in the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 which
provided for imposition of a mandatory two year
sentence, found no such clear and manifest intent to
repeal in either the language or legislative history of the
applicable statutes. Where the language of two statutory
provisions does not suggest irreconcilable conflict, an
intent to repeal will not be inferred.
State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62 (1983). All Graves Act
offenders, even those under 26 years of age, must receive
the mandatory minimum terms prescribed by the Act.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The court acknowledged that the
decision repealed N.J.S.A. 2C:43-5 and N.J.S.A. 30:4-
148 to the extent that these conflicted with the Graves
Act, and that implied repealers were not favored.
Nevertheless, the presumption against implied repealers
was overcome by a showing of irreconcilable
inconsistency. In such situations, the general rule is that
the later expression of the Legislature’s intent is intended
so supersede prior law. Given the clear legislative intent
underlying the Graves Act, the court determined that it
applied to sentences of youthful offenders. (See also,
SENTENCING, this Digest).
State v. Lester, 271 N.J. Super. 289 (App. Div. 1994),
certif. denied, 142 N.J. 453 (1993). Statute which
proscribed maintaining a dwelling as a narcotics
nuisance, N.J.S.A. 24:21a(6), not impliedly repealed by
enactment of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act
(CDRA), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 et seq., since no similar
statutory provision was enacted in the CDRA.
State v. Wrotny, 221 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div.
1987). Unless the terms of the statutory provisions are
inconsistent or repugnant the presumption will be
against an implied repealer. The court concluded that in
this case they were not. Therefore, the provisions of
N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 could not be interpreted in a manner to
imply a repealer of the penalties of these provisions when
the violator had a previous conviction for drunken
driving. (See also, DRUNK DRIVING, this Digest).
Division of Motor Vehicles v. Kleinert, 198 N.J. Super.
363 (App. Div. 1985). Implied repealers of statutes are
disfavored, and only when a later expression of legislative
will is clearly in conflict with an earlier statute on the
same subject should court find a legislative intent to
supersede earlier law. Applying this principle of
statutory construction, the court rejected the claim that
N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.1 impliedly repealed the authority of
the Director of Motor Vehicles to suspend a New Jersey
driver’s license for an out-of-state drunk driving
violation. N.J.S.A. 39:5-30a. The legislative history of
N.J.S.A. 39:5-30.1 indicates that the section was
intended to establish machinery for interstate
enforcement of motor vehicle violations between New
Jersey and other signatory states to the Interstate Driver
License Compact N.J.S.A. 39:5D-1 et seq. However, this
section was not intended to revoke the Director’s
authority, N.J.S.A. 39:5-30a, as to motor vehicle
violations committed by New Jersey drivers in non-
signatory jurisdictions.G. The Preemption Doctrine and Statutory
ConstructionState v. Crawley, 90 N.J. 241 (1982). In view of
legislative history and absence of loitering proscription
from the penal code, the penal code’s “preemption by
exclusion,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-5d, prohibited enforcement of
Newark anti-loitering ordinance.State v. Marain, 322 N.J. Super. 444 (App. Div.
1999), certif. denied, 163 N.J. 10 (1999). A
municipality’s ability to regulate parking, N.J.S.A. 39:4-
8c, does not conflict with N.J.S.A. 39:3-42 which confers
exclusive authority on the State to license or permit use
or operation of a motor vehicle.State v. Burten, 219 N.J. Super. 339 (Law Div, 1987),
aff’d 219 N.J. Super. 156 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied,
107 N.J. 144 (1987). Criminal prosecution under
N.J.S.A. 2A:170-90.2 for failure of an employer to make
contributions to an employee pension plan was
precluded by the Federal Employee Retirement Security
Act, (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § § 1001-1381, which
preempted the field. The legislative history of the federal
statute clearly demonstrated the intent of Congress to
preempt the field for federal regulation, and the state
statute was not saved from preemption pursuit to the
exemption of “any general applicable criminal law of the
state.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144b(4). The court below
concluded that N.J.S.A. 2A:170-90.2 was “specifically
promulgated to deal with employee benefit plans” and as
such did not constitute a “general applicable criminal
law.” Thus, the lower court dismissed the complaints
and the Appellate Division affirmed for substantially the
reasons set forth below.Tri-State Metro Naturists v. Township of Lower, 219
N.J. Super. 103 (Law Div. 1986). The court found that
a municipal ordinance banning nudity on a State beach
was not invalid because of the State preemption doctrine,
but was unenforceable because the site, which was State