VII. GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS (See also,
GRAND JURY, this Digest)
The grand jury has broad investigative authority, and
is afforded wide latitude in conducting investigations. In
re Grand Jury Investigation No. 2184-86, 219 N.J. Super.
90, 92 (Law Div. 1987).
Under Fourth Amendment analysis, a subpoena
duces tecum issued in aid of a grand jury investigation is
reasonable without probable cause if it is “‘sufficiently
limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in
directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably
burdensome.’” In re Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 128 (1968)
(quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967)).
That same standard is applied in a challenge issued under
New Jersey’s racketeering statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et
seq. In re Doe, 294 N.J. Super. at 120. As with grand jury
subpoenas, an unreasonably broad or overly burdensome
administrative demand for documents may be set aside or
modified. Id. at 119-20.
The tests of relevancy and materiality employed to
determine the reasonableness of a subpoena duces tecum
issued by a grand jury are less stringent than the
standards used to test those issued for trials. To uphold
the validity of the subpoena, the State need only establish
(1) the existence of a grand jury investigation and (2) the
nature and subject matter of that investigation. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 167 N.J. Super. 471,
472 (App. Div. 1979). The State may establish these
elements by simple representation by counsel to the
court; affidavits or other formal proofs are not required.
Id. To establish the relevancy of the documents
subpoenaed, the State need only show that the
documents bear some possible relationship, however
indirect, to the grand jury investigation. Id. at 473. See
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 143 N.J.
Super. at 536-39 (holding that subpoenaed documents
must bear some “possible” relationship to the matter
being investigated, the descriptions of the materials must
not be unreasonably vague and nonspecific, and the time
period covered by the materials must be reasonable.
In Grand Jury Investigation, 219 N.J. Super. at 94, the
Law Division held that a grand jury subpoena seeking
fingerprints, palm prints, and handwriting exemplars
from the target of an illegal gambling investigation was
unreasonable in scope because it sought production of
2400 exemplars. The subpoena did not, however, violate
the target’s Fourth Amendment rights or his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at
95.
In re Gail D., 217 N.J. Super. 226, 232 (App. Div.
1987), declined to recognize a novel claim of parent-
child privilege as grounds for quashing grand jury
subpoenas, which sought the testimony of two children
whose father was the target of the investigation into the
death of their mother. The court observed that “the
adoption of a privilege restricting the flow of evidence is
a substantial policy decision uniquely within the
competence of the Supreme Court or the Legislature.” Id.
VIII. RIGHT-TO-KNOW LAW
Where a party seeks to inspect public records for
discovery purposes rather than for introduction at trial,
the appropriate procedural method to be followed is an
action in lieu of prerogative writ pursuant to N.J.S.A.
47:1A-4 of the Right-to-Know Law rather than the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum under R. 1:9-2. Irval
Realty v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm’rs, 115 N.J. Super. 338,
344-45 (App. Div. 1971), aff’d, 61 N.J. 366 (1972);
Bzozowski v. Penn-Reading Seashore Lines, 107 N.J. Super.
467, 472-76 (Law Div. 1969).
Under either the Right-to-Know Law, N.J.S.A.
47:1A-1 et seq., or common law theories of access to
public records, the government entity may establish or
request a court to establish reasonable time and place
restrictions on the terms of the access. Laufgas v. New
Jersey Turnpike Auth., 156 N.J. 436, 440 (1998).