TERRORISTIC THREATSTERRORISTIC THREATSTERRORISTIC THREATSTERRORISTIC THREATSTERRORISTIC THREATS
A person is guilty of the crime of terroristic threats
under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3a if, with a purpose to terrorize
another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of
assembly, or facility of public transportation, or
otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, he or she
threatens to commit a crime of violence or if he or she
threatens to commit a crime of violence in reckless
disregard of the risk of causing such terror or
inconvenience. It does not matter whether the defendant
actually intended to carry out the threat or the victim felt
afraid as a result of the threat. State v. Butterfoss, 234 N.J.
Super. 606, 612 (Law. Div. 1988).
Under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3b, a person is guilty of
terroristic threats if he or she threatens to kill another
with a purpose to put the victim in imminent fear of
death. The threat must be made under circumstances
reasonably causing the victim to believe the immediacy of
the threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out.
The proofs must be assessed against an objective
standard. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 402 (1998);
State v. Smith, 262 N.J. Super. 487, 515 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 134 N.J. 476 (1993); State v. Nolan, 2 05
N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1985). There need not be an
“explicit threat to kill,” however, if in light of the
surrounding circumstances “a reasonable person in that
situation would have felt fear.” Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
at 413-14 (following evidence sufficient to support
finding that husband committed the crime of terroristic
threats: husband’s reference to having a “choice, which
term he had used previously in context of a threat to kill
his wife; his insistence, unusual after an argument, that
she come up to the bedroom where the guns were kept;
his prior threats, intimidation and abuse of their
children); State v. Milano, 167 N.J. Super. 318, 322-23
(Law Div. 1979), aff’d, 172 N.J. Super. 361 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 84 N.J. 421 (1980). Thus, a defendant’s
prior acts of domestic violence against the victim are
relevant and admissible in a prosecution for terroristic
threats to show that the victim had reason to believe the
defendant would carry out his threat. Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. at 403; State v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334,
342 (1996). A limiting instruction as to the evidence
should be given upon request. State v. Chenique-Puey,
145 N.J. at 342; N.J.R.E. 105.
THEFTTHEFTTHEFTTHEFTTHEFT
I. BREADTH, CONSOLIDATION AND GRADING
OF OFFENSESThe theft statute broadly governs various thefts of
property and services, by various means, and includes
failure to make a required disposition, receipt of stolen
property, and fencing stolen property. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
1 et seq.; State v. Portuondo, 277 N.J. Super. 337, 341-45
(App. Div. 1994) (holding that fencing is a crime with
penalties and not just a harm with remedies). Aside from
its breadth, the most significant change effectuated by
the penal code is the consolidation of the theft offenses.
The Legislature consolidated all theft offenses under
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2a.The purpose of consolidation was to avoid the
difficulties encountered under prior law which would
permit a defendant charged with a theft by a particular
method to be acquitted if the proofs demonstrated that
the taking was actually committed by another method.
See State v. Talley, 94 N.J. 385, 391 (1983). On the basis
of consolidation, the Supreme Court in Talley reinstated
the conviction of a defendant indicted for robbery. The
State presented a case that defendant forced victims at
gunpoint to turn over their wallets, while the defense
presented a case that defendant deceived the victims into
giving him money for herbal tea, which was
misrepresented as marijuana. The Court noted that
“[b]y virtue of the ‘consolidation’ provision of N.J.S.A.
2C:20-2a, a defendant charged with robbery is now on
notice that... theft is within the four corners of the
robbery indictment.” Id. at 393. The specific kind of
theft proven at trial need not have been considered by the
grand jury. Ibid. However, the subject matter of the theft
must relate to the harm protected against. State v.
Freeman, 324 N.J. Super. 463, 470 (App. Div. 1999). In
Talley, the security of the victims’ money was the harm
to be guarded against. Since theft is a necessarily
included element of robbery, a conviction for theft must
merge into the completed robbery. State v. Lawson, 217
N.J. Super. 47 (App. Div. 1987).In State v. Smith, 136 N.J. 245 (1994), the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that where the State presented
a case of a knife-point robbery of a cabdriver and where
the defense presented a case of defendant simply
absconding the cab without paying, resulting in a theft
of services, the trial court need not instruct the jury on
theft of services, since the harm to be guarded against was
the theft of the cabdriver’s money and not the theft of the