determine the amount involved in the theft. N.J.S.A.
2C:20-2b(4); State v. Castaldo, 271 N.J. Super. 254, 258
(App. Div. 1994); State v. Burks, 188 N.J. Super. 55, 60
(App. Div.), certif. den., 93 N.J. 285 (1983). The
amount of an attempted theft may be aggregated. State
v. Lindsey, 245 N.J. Super. 466, 627-29 (App. Div.
1991). Attempted theft need not be charged in the
indictment, but the jury must be instructed regarding
attempt, and failure to do so results in reversal of the
attempt counts. Id.
B. Theft from the Person
Where evidence demonstrated that the victim’s
purse was in her custody and control when stolen, the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that theft from the
person, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(2)(d), required the property
to be in the custody and control of the victim was held to
be harmless error. State v. Link, 197 N.J. Super. 615, 619
(App. Div. 1984), certif. den., 101 N.J. 234 (1985). A
purse-snatching is, at this time, a theft and not a robbery.
State v. Sein, 124 N.J. 209 (1991). The actor will be
responsible for the value of all contents in the purse even
though he has no knowledge of the contents. State v.
Combariarti, 186 N.J. Super. 375 (Law Div.), aff’d, 192
N.J. Super. 131 (App. Div. 1983), certif. denied, 97 N.J.
694 (1984). The common law rule that unexplained
possession of recently stolen property gives rise to an
inference of knowledge that the property is stolen survives
in the Code. State v. Alexander, 215 N.J. Super. 522 (App.
Div. 1987); State v. Richardson, 208 N.J. Super. 399
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 105 N.J. 552 (1986).
An inoperable automobile remains movable property
within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3, and the fact
that tires have been removed does not mean that the
property does not satisfy the statutory definition.
Richardson, supra. Employing a juvenile in an
automobile theft is a strict-liability second-degree crime
which does not merge into the theft of the automobile.
N.J.S.A. 2C:20-17.
C. Theft by Deception
While the intent to defraud is not an element of
issuing bad checks, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5, it is for theft by
deception, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4. State v. Kelm, 289 N.J.
Super. 55 (App. Div.), certif. den., 146 N.J. 68 (1996).
Uttering a forged instrument merges into the theft by
deception. State v. Streater, 233 N.J. Super. 537 (App.
Div.), certif. den., 117 N.J. 667 (1989); State v. Alevras,
213 N.J. Super. 331, 339-42 (App. Div. 1986)(merging
bad check conviction, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-5, into theft by
deception conviction). The intent to defraud must be
particularly instructed and molded to the facts of the
case, especially a complex fraud. State v. Damiano, 322
N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 1999), certif. den., 163 N.J.
396 (2000). Failure to do so resulted in reversal of 44
convictions. A deficient aggregation instruction
provided another reason to reverse the convictions. Id.Taking of money incident to a pyramid scheme is
theft by deception. State v. De Luzio, 274 N.J. Super. 101,
118 (App. Div.), aff’d in part, 136 N.J. 363 (1993).
Obtaining a loan on false documents and misrepresenta-
tion as to the status of liens on real estate pledged as
collateral is theft by deception. State v. Rodgers, 230 N.J.
Super. 593, 600-602 (App. Div.), certif. den., 117 N.J. 54
(1989).D. Theft by ExtortionN.J.S.A. 2C:20-5 proscribes theft by extortion. The
elements “purposely threatens,” “not substantially
benefit the actor,” and “materially harm another person”
were found plain and unambiguous. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5a,
g; State v. Roth, 289 N.J. Super. 152, 162 (App. Div.),
certif. den., 146 N.J. 68 (1996). In Roth, the Appellate
Division affirmed defendant’s theft by extortion
conviction for his threat to move to set aside a sheriff’s sale
of real estate, where he could not reasonably bid on the
estate and where he had no interest in the estate (and
thereby had no commercial nexus to the subject matter
of the threat), unless the successful bidder paid him
$2,000. Id. at 158-62.E. Receiving and Fencing Stolen PropertyThe common law rule that unexplained possession of
recently stolen property gives rise to an inference of
knowledge that the property is stolen survives in the
Code. State v. Alexander, 215 N.J. Super. 522 (App. Div.
1987); State v. Richardson, 208 N.J. Super. 399 (App.
Div.), certif. den., 105 N.J. 552 (1986). It is a crime
under the code to knowingly bring movable property of
another into the State believing it is probably stolen --
this includes circumstances where defendant himself
brings the property into the State. State v. Cole, 204 N.J.
Super. 618 (App. Div. 1985). It is also criminal for a
person to receive property of another, believing that it is
probably stolen, even if the property was not stolen in
fact. State v. Bujan, 274 N.J. Super. 132 (App. Div.
1994)(reinstating dismissal of theft charges regarding a
sting operation in which defendants purchased
pharmaceuticals they believed were stolen). Possession of
another’s access device raises an inference that it is