III. CONSTRUCTION
The Legislature’s concern for privacy interests of
individuals demands strict interpretation and applica-
tion of the Act. State v. Worthy, 141 N.J. 368, 379
(1995); State v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 437 (1981); In re
Wire Communication, 76 N.J. 255, 260 (1978); State v.
Bisaccia, 251 N.J. Super. 508, 510 (Law Div. 1991).
The Federal Wiretap Act, (18 U.S.C.A. §2510 et
seq.), is paramount, it binds federal and state officials, and
sets a threshold that may not be lowered. State v. Minter,
116 N.J. 269, 274 (1989). In any electronic
surveillance, there must be compliance with the
provisions of the federal statute, as well as the state
statute. State v. Barber, 169 N.J. Super. 26, 30 (Law Div.
1979). Interpretation of a state wiretap statute can never
be controlling where it imposes requirements less
stringent than the federal standard. Id. However, if the
state sets forth procedures which are more exacting than
those of the federal statute, as the case is in New Jersey,
then the requirements of the state law would have to be
met as well. Id. Accordingly, courts may construe their
own state law so as to afford their citizens additional
protection. State v. Catania, 85 N.J. at 436; see also State
v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 344-46 (1982). For example, in
New Jersey, the police may not circumvent more
restrictive requirements of the Act by bringing in federal
agents and requesting that they tap the telephone in
accordance with federal standards. See State v. Minter,
116 N.J. at 283.
The Act is intended to protect privacy interests to a
greater extent than the federal wiretap statute, (State v.
Worthy, 141 N.J. at 385), and is more restrictive in some
respects. State v. Diaz, 308 N.J. Super. 504, 510 (App.
Div. 1998); State v. Lane, 279 N.J. Super. 209, 217 (App.
Div), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 94 (1995). However, when
portions of the federal and state acts are substantially
similar in language, it is appropriate to conclude that the
intent of the Legislature when enacting sections of the Act
was to follow the federal act. State v. Diaz, 308 N.J. Super.
at 510; State v. Fornino, 223 N.J. Super. 531, 544 (App.
Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 570, cert. denied, 488 U.S.
859, 109 S.Ct. 152 (1988).
IV. DEFINITIONS IN THE ACT (N.J.S.A.
2A:156A-2)
The words and phrases used throughout the Act are
defined in N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2.
A. Aggrieved Person (N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2k)To be an aggrieved person for the purpose of
challenging a wiretap, the person must be one who has
been a target of a search and seizure by electronic
surveillance, as distinguished from one who merely
claims prejudice through the use of evidence gathered as
a consequence of a search and seizure directed at someone
else, or has been a party to any of the intercepted
conversations. State v. Barber, 169 N.J. Super. 26, 31-34
(Law Div. 1979); State v. Murphy, 137 N.J. Super. 404,
413 (Law Div. 1975), rev’d o.g. 148 N.J. Super. 542
(App. Div. 1977) (defendants who did not participate in
any of the intercepted telephone conversations pursuant
to a court order and who did not have any proprietary
interest in the premises from which the telephone
conversations originated did not have standing to
challenge the legality of the wiretap order); see also State
v. Catania, 85 N.J. 418, 425 (1981) (a defendant who
was a party to at least one conversation, innocent or
incriminating, during the course of a wiretap has
standing to suppress the entire wiretap results because of
the State’s failure to minimize its interception of
nonrelevant conversations during the wiretap). Thus, in
Barber, where the defendants were not a party to the
overheard conversations which were claimed to have been
illegally intercepted, and where the defendants were not
targets of the wiretap, those defendants did not qualify as
“aggrieved persons” under federal or state law, and
therefore, had no standing to challenge that the
interception of the information was unlawfully obtained.
Id. at 31; see also State v. Catania, 85 N.J. at 425.B. Electronic, mechanical or other device (N.J.S.A.
2A:156A-2d)The Act is limited in its application to wiretapping
mechanisms designed to intercept the substance of
communications heard over telephone and other wire or
cable facilities. State v. Murphy, 137 N.J. Super. at 433-- In 1993, the term “intercepting device” was
substituted by “electronic, mechanical or other device,”
and provided for the interception of electronic
communications. See N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-2d
A touch-tone decoder is not an intercepting device
within the meaning of the Act, since it cannot be used for
any purpose other than to record the assigned numbers
of telephones to which outgoing calls are made and to
record the fact that the telephone is in use. State v.
Murphy, 137 N.J. Super. at 433-34. An extension
telephone regularly installed and being used by an
investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary