exercise all of the duties of the prosecutor in and during
the latter’s actual absence or disability).
XI. THE CONTENTS OF THE APPLICATION
FOR A WIRETAP ORDER (N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9)
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9 provides that the application
for an order must contain the following:
A. The authority of the applicant. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9a;
B. The identity and qualifications of the investigative or
law enforcement officers or the agency for whom the
authority to intercept a wire, electronic or oral
communication is sought, including the identity of the
person who authorized the application. N.J.S.A.
2A;156A-9b; see also State v. Dye, 60 N.J. 518, 527-28,
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1090 93 S.Ct. 699 (1972)
(appellate court will not disturb a finding of qualification
by the trial court unless there is an unreasonable
evaluation of the facts and a mistaken use of discretion);
C. The identity of the suspect, if known, committing the
offense and whose communications are to be intercepted.
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9c(1). However, the wiretap order
need not particularize and identify each and every
individual whose conversation is to be overheard. See
State v. Murphy, 148 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div.
1977) (where affidavits for wiretap clearly indicated that
the defendants were targets of investigation and that the
telephone to be taped were used by them, the defendants’
names were improperly omitted from the intercept
orders; however, the omission did not warrant
suppression since there was no prejudice to the
defendants); State v. Sanchez, 149 N.J. Super. 381, 386-
87 (Law Div. 1977) (because the identity of the
defendants were unknown until after wiretaps had
begun, the defendants were not “targets” in any of the
wiretaps, and thus, there was no requirement that they be
named in the wiretap applications; moreover, assuming
probable cause, the conversations of all persons using the
telephone may be intercepted);
D. The details of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9c(2);
E. The type of communications to be intercepted.
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9c(3); see State v. Braeunig, 122 N.J.
Super. 319, 325 (App. Div. 1973) (an order referring to
communications which are evidentiary of such offenses as
bookmaking and conspiracy adequately described the
type of communications that were to be intercepted);
F. Probable cause that the communication will occur
over the particular wire or electronic communication
facility that is being tapped. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9c(3); see
also State v. Benevento, 138 N.J. Super. 211, 214 (App.
Div. 1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 276 (1976);G. The place where the wire or electronic
communication facility is located or where the oral
communication is to be intercepted. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-
9c(4). However, by amendment in 1993, an application
need not contain such information for interception of an
oral communication if the application: (1) is approved by
the Attorney General or county prosecutor; (2) contains
a full and complete statement as to why such a
specification is unpractical and identifies the person
committing the offense and whose communications are
to be intercepted; and (3) a judge finds that such
specification is unpractical. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9g(1).
With regard to an interception of a wire or electronic
communication, specificity of the information as
required by this subsection is unnecessary, if the
application: (1) is approved by the Attorney General or
county prosecutor; (2) the application identifies the
person believed to be committing the offense and whose
communications are to be intercepted and the applicant
identifies the purpose on the part of the person thwarting
interception by changing facilities; and (3) a judge finds
that such a purpose has been adequately shown. N.J.S.A.
2A:156A-9g(2). In addition, an interception of a
communication under this provision shall not begin
until the facilities from which, or the place where, the
communication is to be intercepted is ascertained by the
person implementing the order. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9g.
Furthermore, a provider of a wire or electronic
communication that has received such an order may
make a motion that the court modify or quash the order
on the ground that the provider’s assistance with respect
to the interception cannot be performed in a timely or
reasonable fashion. Id. The court, upon notice to the
Attorney General or county prosecutor, must decide such
a motion expeditiously. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9c(4);
N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9g;H. The period of time over which the interception is
required. N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-9c(5). However, if the
character of the investigation is such that authorization
for the interception should not automatically terminate
when the described type of communication has been first
obtained, a statement is required establishing probable
cause to believe that additional communications of the
same type will occur thereafter. Id.;