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ARSON, CAUSING OR RISKINGARSON, CAUSING OR RISKINGARSON, CAUSING OR RISKINGARSON, CAUSING OR RISKINGARSON, CAUSING OR RISKING

WIDESPREAD INJURY ORWIDESPREAD INJURY ORWIDESPREAD INJURY ORWIDESPREAD INJURY ORWIDESPREAD INJURY OR

DAMAGE, CRIMINAL MISCHIEFDAMAGE, CRIMINAL MISCHIEFDAMAGE, CRIMINAL MISCHIEFDAMAGE, CRIMINAL MISCHIEFDAMAGE, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF

I. ARSON: SCOPE OF THE OFFENSE .................................................................................................

Under N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1, a person is guilty of arson
when he causes a fire or an explosion that injures the
property or person of another, confers or receives a benefit
for causing a fire, or fails to combat a fire when he has a
duty to do so.

In State v. Williams, 263 N.J. Super 620 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477 (1993), the Appellate
Division held that the owner of a car who hires someone
to burn that car may be held legally accountable as an
accomplice to the arsonist. Under pre-Code law an owner
could not be held criminally liable for burning his own
car, and defendant here claimed that since he could not
be liable as a principal, he could not be liable as an
accomplice. The Appellate Division noted that even if
the pre-Code law survived the Code, which it doubted,
the Legislature was free to prohibit the owner from
soliciting or aiding another in burning the car, which was
determined to be a “structure,” even if it did not prohibit
the owner from burning the car himself.

II. EVIDENCE

In State in the Interest of M.C., 335 N.J. Super. 325,
No. 5799-98T1 (App. Div. Dec. 5, 2000), the Appellate
Division reversed defendant’s convictions for arson,
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1b, failure to report a dangerous fire,
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1c(2), recklessly causing widespread
damage, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-2b, and criminal mischief,
N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3, because defendant was unaware of the
fire set by his codefendant, and therefore did not share
codefendant’s purpose, even though he saw some smoke
afterwards. Slip op. at 4-6. The Court also concluded
that spraying aerosol cans into disposable lighters
creating blow torches that projected into the air alone was
incapable of satisfying the mental or causation
requirements of the “purposely starts a fire” element as
proscribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1b. Slip op at 2-4.

Likewise, in State in the Interest of M.N., 267 N.J.
Super. 482 (App. Div. 1993), the Appellate Division
concluded that the finding that the juvenile “purposely”
lit a match does not in the circumstances of the case satisfy
the requirements of “purposely starts a fire” as proscribed
in N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1b. Purposely lighting a match, in the

absence of an additional act or omission by the accused,

could not in these circumstances have “[t]hereby

recklessly plac[ed]” the structures of another in danger.

N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1b(2). As a matter of fundamental

fairness, the State could not represent to the trial court

the charge of third-degree criminal mischief upon which

the trial court had failed to make a determination.

In State v. Krieger, 193 N.J. Super. 568 (App. Div.

1983), rev’d and aff’g dissent below, 96 N.J. 256, cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 431, 83 L.Ed.2d 358

(1984), the trial court properly denied defendant’s

motion for judgement of acquittal at the close of the

State’s case on the ground that the State presented

sufficient independent proofs to corroborate defendant’s

confession to arson. These corroborative proofs included

the factual circumstances — such as the time, place, and

method used to ignite the flames — surrounding the two

fires which defendant admitted setting. See also State v.

Lucas, 30 N.J. 37 (1959); but cf. State in the Interest of J.F.,

286 N.J. Super. 89 (App. Div. 1995).

In State v. Parton, 251 N.J. Super. 230 (1991), certif.

denied, 127 N.J. 560 (1992), affirming defendant’s

conviction for arson, defendant was found near the fire

laughing shortly after an abortive date with a woman who

lived in the blazing building. Defendant was arrested for

soliciting near the building for victims of the fire the day

after the fire. Defendant provided inconsistent

statements regarding his whereabouts, and defendant

volunteered inculpatory motives, e.g., hatred of landlords

and jealousy of the woman from the abortive date.

Bloodhound evidence tracking defendant from his

residence to the building was also properly admitted.

Evidence that defendant visited the grave of one of

the victims after the fire and displayed deep remorse was

held to be probative of consciousness of guilt in State v.

Mills, 51 N.J. 277, 286, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 186, 89

S.Ct. 105, 21 L.Ed.2d 104 (1968).

Acting as a lookout knowing the intentions of the fire

starter was sufficient proof to sustain a count of

conspiracy to commit arson. State v. Grey, 281 N.J. Super.

2, 11 (App. Div. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 147 N.J.

4 (1996).

The owner of a building who solicited another to

burn the building and further provided the potential

arsonist with building plans and specifications and fire

department information was properly convicted for

attempted arson, even though the plan was contingent

upon obtaining insurance. State v. Jovanovic, 174 N.J.