cdTOCtest

165, 170 (App. Div. 1982), certif. denied, 93 N.J. 261
(1983).

VII. CAUSING OR RISKING WIDESPREAD

INJURY OR DAMAGE (See also, ENVIRON-

MENTAL PROSECUTIONS, this Digest)

A. It is a second-degree crime to knowingly or purposely
cause an explosion, a flood, an avalanche, a collapse of a
building or the release of gas or radioactive material, or to
cause widespread injury in any manner. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-
2.

B. Proof that a defendant knowingly released chemical
waste into a river is sufficient; when the State proves one
of the specific acts enumerated in the statute, proof that
widespread injury resulted is not required. State v. Iron
Oxide Corp., 178 N.J. Super. 303, 309 (Law Div. 1981).

C. It is a third-degree crime to recklessly cause
widespread injury or damage. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-2b.

D. Proof that a defendant abortively attempted to move
toxic barrels with another and then subsequently
successfully solicited several laborers to move several 55-
gallon drums of hazardous waste to the rear of an adjacent
property lot suffice for a conviction of risking widespread
injury or damage. State v. Sunzar, 331 N.J. Super. 248
(Law Div. 1999).

E. It is a fourth-degree crime to recklessly create a risk of
widespread injury even if no such injury occurs. N.J.S.A.
2C:17-2c.

F. Consequently, evidence that a juvenile offender placed
a smoke bomb in his vacant high school locker during
school hours was sufficient to adjudicate him delinquent
for the fourth-degree offense of creating widespread
injury. State in the Interest of D.B., 181 N.J. Super. 586,
595 (J. & D.R. 1981).

G. Widespread injury is defined as:

1. Serious bodily injury to 10 or more people, or


2. Damage to 10 or more habitations, or


3. Damage to a building normally containing 50 or
   more persons. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-2e.

H. The fourth-degree offense of creating widespread
injury is not a lesser-included offense of second degree

aggravated assault where defendant had been hurling

firecrackers into the air; defendant’s act did not

jeopardize the safety of more than 10 people as required

by the statute. State v. Hunter, 194 N.J. Super. 177, 180

(App. Div. 1984).

VIII. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF

A. Scope of the Offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3.

1. Criminal mischief is the purposeful or knowing
   injury to the property of another, or the reckless injury to
   property in the employment of fire, explosives or other
   dangerous means, or the purposeful or reckless tampering
   with property so as to endanger persons or property.


2. The grading of the offense depends upon the
   amount of pecuniary damage of the property. It is a
   third-degree crime to cause a pecuniary loss of $2,000 or
   more, a fourth-degree crime to cause damage amounting
   to more than $500 but less than $2,000 and disorderly
   persons offense to cause a loss of less than $500. Effective
   July 10, 1998, a person commits a fourth-degree crime
   if he impairs or interferes with any device that serves air
   traffic control. It is a third-degree crime if the actor
   recklessly cause bodily injury or damage to property. It
   is a second-degree crime if the actor recklessly causes
   death. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3b(4), b(5). Effective May 3,
   1999, it is a third-degree crime to tamper with a grave or
   crypt with the intent to desecrate, destroy, or steal
   human remains. N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3b(6).

B. Evidence

In State v. Davidson, 225 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div.

1988), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 594 (1988), the Appellate

Division affirmed the trial judge’s ruling to admit as

evidence of “other crimes” the fact that defendant poured

rice or sugar into the victim’s car gas tank prior to

committing a later act of criminal mischief upon the same

victim’s house. Pursuant to Evid. R. 55 (N.J.R.E. 404

(b)), such prior acts were relevant for purposes of showing

the defendant’ s intent and state of mind in the

commission of the act of criminal mischief.

C. Severance of the Indictment

It was not error for the trial court to deny severance

of various counts charging defendant with malicious

mischief and assault and battery, where the charges

involved the same victim and the defendant’s motive —

to injure the victim for engaging in a love affair with

defendant’s wife -- constituted a common scheme or