THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND THE PARTITION OF INDIArefugees fled from one part of the country to another. Pakistan, which
Jinnah did not himself excise from the body of India but which he made
the departing British cut for him, proved to be an unstable construction
and a cause of continuous friction in the entire region. The British, who
had always taken pride in having established the political unity of India,
undid their achievement at the end of their rule. How did this come
about?
The partition of India and the foundation of Pakistan was—more than
any comparable event in human history—the work of one man. This is
why any enquiry into the course of events which led to this end has always
concentrated on the career of M.A.Jinnah. When did he finally make up his
mind? At what point was he still prepared to compromise? Who prevented
such a compromise? Many different answers have been given to these
questions. But this retrospective focus on Jinnah detracts attention from
the complex and fluid condition of Muslim politics in India, which for a
long time made Jinnah more of a pleader than a leader. He was not a
fervent Muslim and not an agitator of the masses; he was a moderate,
secular nationalist who looked to Gokhale as a man to emulate in Indian
politics. He was also first and foremost a brilliant lawyer who knew how
to take care of his clients’ interests. In the political field the Muslims of
India were his clients and even as a young member of the Imperial
Legislative Council he scored a big success with the passing of the Waqf
Validating Act of 1913, which was of benefit to all Muslims who wanted
to establish religious trusts. During the First World War when Muslim
opinion became more nationalist, Jinnah could play his favourite role as
ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. The Congress-League pact of 1916
was the high point of his career in this respect. He himself had been a
member of the National Congress before he joined the Muslim League and
he remained a member of both organisations, as he had been assured that
the League membership would not be incompatible with his Congress
membership.
The emphasis on provincial politics which started with the introduction
of ‘responsible government’ was a setback for Jinnah. He was a man of the
Muslim diaspora, his arena was the Imperial Legislative Council and he
had had no contact with the problems of the Muslim majority provinces.
The Khilafat agitation which fired the imagination of the Indian Muslims
was to him a case of false consciousness and his political judgement proved
to be right in this respect. Nevertheless, there was little consolation for him
in being right but isolated—as he was for a long time after 1919. He
always hoped for the emergence of another sequence of events similar to
those of 1916, which would enable him to act as mediator between the
Congress and the League. But the Congress was strong and did not need
him, while the League was moribund. Jinnah grew old, became ill and
increasingly bitter.