A History of India, Third Edition

THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND THE PARTITION OF INDIA

Wavell received no reply from London, but his plan had obviously
caused such consternation in Attlee’s cabinet that a decision was made to
send a cabinet mission to India, composed of Secretary of State Lord
Pethick-Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and Lord Alexander. The records
provide no clue as to the emergence of this idea. Attlee and his colleagues
had been unhappy with Wavell’s handling of Indian politics for some time.
The names of various potential emissaries were discussed, but it was clear
that only a cabinet minister could supersede the viceroy in political
negotiations in India. So finally three of them were dispatched to India and
Wavell was not even informed of the mission’s terms of reference.
Had Wavell been a politician, he probably would have resigned at this
point; he was, instead, a loyal soldier and did what he thought to be his
duty until the bitter end. Attlee, on the other hand, ought to have replaced
Wavell with a viceroy of his choice as soon as possible—but he probably
did not want to shock the Conservative opposition by what would have
appeared to be a partisan appointment. Due to this prevarication British
policy with regard to India did not have a clear profile. The cabinet
mission did not exactly help to remedy this deficiency. It spent nearly four
months in India and evolved a complicated scheme. When it returned
home, however, it left Wavell pretty much where he was before the
ministers had arrived and it was only when he produced another disastrous
‘Breakdown Plan’ that he was finally replaced.

The cabinet mission scheme and the advent of partition

When the cabinet mission arrived in India it was confronted with a
Congress and a League which were less prepared for compromise than
ever. Both parties had done very well in the elections, provincial parties
had been nearly eliminated. A clear-cut, two-party system had emerged in
India. This was not, however, due to the principle of interest aggregation as
fostered by the majority election system: it was simply a product of the
system of separate electorates for Muslims. This time Jinnah’s calculations
proved accurate and the League had captured about 90 per cent of all
Muslim seats. With such a mandate he was sure to get what he wanted.
The British, who had themselves created the separate electorates, were now
unable to undo the consequences of this fateful system—even though they
were genuinely interested in maintaining the unity of India.
The scheme which the cabinet mission evolved for this purpose
envisaged three tiers; the provinces, regional groups of provinces and a
federal centre charged with a few well-defined central subjects, such as
foreign affairs, defence, currency, etc. Jinnah accepted the scheme because
he interpreted the regional groups of provinces as a de facto recognition of
his Pakistan demand: these groups would have constituent assemblies of
their own; the constitution of the federal centre could eventually be