THE REPUBLIChad been exchanged between the Indian and the Chinese governments for
quite some time. A few years later this conflict was to break Nehru’s heart.
He had been in touch with the Chinese nationalists in the course of the
Indian freedom movement and he had great sympathy for the aspirations
of the Chinese nation. In his first foreign policy speeches after India
attained independence he had referred to Asia as a zone of peace: conflict
had started only with the intrusion of imperialism. With the emancipation
of Asia peace was bound to be restored. In this optimistic spirit of
antiimperialism he had also welcomed the victory of Mao Tse Tung and
had hoped for peace and harmony with the great neighbour. When in 1950
the Chinese occupied Tibet—which had long enjoyed a quasi-independent
status—Nehru quickly gave up those Tibetan outposts which India had
inherited from the British. These outposts were imperialistic relics to him.
In 1954 Nehru concluded a treaty with the People’s Republic of China
concerning India’s trade with Tibet. Except for a few passes which the
traders were permitted to cross, there was no reference to the boundary in
that treaty. Both sides obviously refrained from touching that subject at
that time—Nehru perhaps in the hope that the border was considered to be
a natural one which was not open to dispute. The five principles of
peaceful coexistence (panchashila) were embodied in this treaty: (1) mutual
respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) non-
aggression; (3) non-interference with the affairs of others; (4) equality and
mutual benefit; (5) peaceful coexistence. The Soviet Union and its allies, as
well as the non-aligned nations, found this formula very convenient. It
contained an implicit rejection of Western interventionism and the
American pact system.
The anti-imperialist fraternisation of India and China was a short-lived
phenomenon. National interest soon prevailed and led to a tough border
conflict. The consolidation of the Chinese hold on Tibet, as well as on
other areas of Central Asia, was a problem. Military infrastructure was
required to maintain it and a ring road was constructed which led from
China to Tibet and from there via the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and
Mongolia and then back to China. At a crucial point some Indian territory
(Aksai Chin) obstructed this connection. Beyond Aksai Chin was the
terrible desert, Takla Makan, which was a major obstacle. Faced with the
dilemma of violating Indian territory or getting stuck in the desert, the
Chinese opted for the first course and quietly built a road through Aksai
Chin. In the meantime, they provoked incidents on the northeastern border
so as to divert attention from their real aims. They also published maps
which showed the border in Assam at the foot of the mountains rather
than on the watershed. The watershed line had been settled by the 1914
McMahon border commission, which had also included a Chinese delegate
who initialled the protocol, although it was not subsequently ratified by
the Chinese government. Actually, there was no disagreement about the