THE REPUBLICAfter this trial run, Ayub prepared Operation ‘Grand Slam’ in order to
capture Kashmir. In a quick offensive Pakistan’s mighty Patton tanks were
supposed to cut off the only road which connects India with Kashmir. If
Shastri again stuck to local defence only and refrained from opening a
second front, Ayub was sure to win. He would slam the door to Kashmir
so hard and fast that India would be at his mercy. But this time Shastri did
not play the game according to the rules set by Ayub. Soon after Operation
‘Grand Slam’ commenced on 1 September 1965, Indian troops marched
towards Lahore. Then a great tank battle was fought near Sialkot,
Pakistan, and the Indian army scored a victory. Pakistan had relied too
much on the superior American tanks without giving them adequate
support. Thus a young Muslim soldier of the Indian army was able to gun
down three of these tanks with his anti-tank weapon before he was spotted
and shot. Pakistan also did not have enough spare parts for these tanks,
while the Indian vehicles could be easily repaired in India’s own ordnance
factories. Furthermore, India stepped up its arms production and defence
efforts after the traumatic experience of the Chinese invasion; Pakistan, on
the other hand, was not adequately prepared for a full-scale war.
Ayub had put all his cards on a quick first strike and had now lost his
gamble. The Chinese were not willing to bail him out, either. Just for show
they provoked a border dispute in Sikkim and delivered an ultimatum to
Shastri, threatening to open a second front there. Shastri ignored the
ultimatum and the Chinese made no move. They later maintained that
India had quietly removed the border fortifications to which the Chinese
had objected and, therefore, no Chinese action was required. But this, of
course, was no consolation for Pakistan. Left in the lurch by China, Ayub
had to arrive at a ceasefire agreement with India while Indian troops held
several areas of Pakistani territory. Ayub lost face and Shastri emerged as a
courageous leader whom nobody would now dare to call weak.
At this stage the Soviet Union saw a great chance of becoming an
umpire in South Asian affairs by acting as a mediator between India and
Pakistan. India could not reject the offer of this friendly power and
actually hoped to get the Soviet Union involved in the maintenance of the
status quo in South Asia. Pakistan was eager to go to any conference table
because the withdrawal of Indian troops from Pakistani territory could
only be achieved by negotiation as the battle had been lost. In January
1966 Ayub, Shastri and the Soviet prime minister Kosygin, met at
Tashkent. The negotiations were difficult and protracted. Shastri insisted
that Pakistan should sign a declaration never to use force again and he
wanted the Soviet Union to act as signatory witness and guarantor that
Pakistan would keep its promise. Ayub threatened to leave the conference,
but he could not afford to do this because there was no other way of
getting rid of the Indian troops. Finally, he signed the declaration and
Shastri agreed to withdraw the Indian troops. The Soviet Union refused to