THE REPUBLICThe agenda of cooperation was confined to cultural, scientific and
economic affairs to begin with. All decisions have to be unanimous, so
even the tiniest partner—the Maldives—could veto a resolution of SAARC.
Nevertheless, a beginning has been made and a forum established which
may serve other purposes, too, in the course of future developments.
In recent years some dramatic changes have occurred in South Asia.
Whereas India had been an apprehensive observer of superpower rivalry in
the region in earlier years, it now took on the arduous task of policing the
region, with the blessings of both superpowers. This caused resentment
among India’s smaller neighbours, but they had to accept it as a fact of life.
Some had reason to be grateful, as for example the government of the
Maldives, which was saved by Indian intervention from being swept away
by a coup in 1988. Others complained about a high-handed abuse of
power, as Nepal did when it was faced with an Indian blockade in 1989.
The most complicated case was India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987
which was supposed to be a swift police action by an ‘Indian peace-
keeping force’ but which turned into a long occupation of northern Sri
Lanka.
India’s involvement began with its support of the Tamil terrorists of Sri
Lanka whose activities increased after the Sinhala pogrom directed against
Tamils living in the diaspora in southern Sri Lanka in 1983. President
Jayewardene’s army was only a tiny parade force but he geared it up with
the help of various foreign powers in order to seek a military solution. His
new army was still no match for the Tamil guerrilla fighters, but when it
closed in on Jaffna in 1987, India air-dropped supplies for the beleaguered
Tamils. Jayewardene at first protested against Indian interference, but then
signed an accord with Rajiv Gandhi in July 1987. The Indian army was
now supposed to disarm the terrorists, but in this it did not succeed. A
protracted war ensued which caused severe losses to India in terms of men,
money and reputation. Jayewardene’s successor, Premadasa, who was
under great pressure from right-wing Sinhala terrorists, put an ultimatum
to India, asking for a withdrawal of Indian troops by July 1989. This, of
course, did not happen; instead a new accord was signed in September
which postponed the day of reckoning. At a time when the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 came as a relief to India, but also
obliged it to stand by the Kabul regime, India remained deeply involved in
Sri Lanka.
Rajiv Gandhi’s defeat in the elections of 1989 made it easier for India to
withdraw from Sri Lanka as the new government was not committed to
the accord signed in 1987. By the spring of 1990 all Indian soldiers had left
the island. A costly and frustrating venture had come to an end. Some
Indian experts claim that India was close to achieving a decisive victory
just before its troops had to be withdrawn. Perhaps this may explain why
the Tamil Tigers assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991. They may have