The Power of the Written Word 281^R8sei proóht0n – ½8seiß proóht0n is a collocation in Byzantine Greek, it
means “the sayings of the prophets” or, generally speaking, “the prophetic
words of the Old Testament” (proó‰tai are not only the “prophets”, but also
all biblical figures of great significance, like David, Abraham, Moses, etc.). The
use of the singular is quite unusual and the dative case poses a problem: does
it mean “with”, “through”, “in accordance with”? There can be little doubt,
however, that the epigram refers to the biblical prohibitions against idolatry,
not only laid down in the Ten Commandments, but also categorically stated in
numerous other texts of the Old Testament. Më bl6ponteß to¦ß k1tz – the verb
bl6pz is always transitive and cannot govern a dative: to¦ß k1tz cannot be the
object of bl6ponteß, but must be an adverbial modifier. In his commentary,
Theodore of Stoudios writes that the “theologians” (that is, the evangelists)
portrayed the figure of Christ not solely on the basis of what the prophets had
said, but also of what they themselves had seen with their own eyes (oœke5ô
aJtov5ô); and shortly afterwards, he paraphrases to¦ß k1tz as to¦ß k1tz
̧óqalmo¦ß. This is probably the correct interpretation of this strange adverbial
phrase. Speck rightly sees a connection with the Horos of the Iconoclast Coun-
cil of 754: eÉ tiß (...) më ™x Ýlhß kard5aß proskyn! aJtñn (sc. tñn qe¦on to ̄ Qeo ̄
Lögoy carakt‰ra) Ámmasi noero¦ß^35. In a poem dating from c. 874, Christopher
Protasekretis warns a group of newly-converted Jews not to interpret the
prophecies of the Old Testament in a literal sense: t0n proóht0n t2ß ½8seiß
szmatik0ß më nöø (...) mhdê to ̄to ™kd6coy ̧óqalmo¦ß to¦ß sark5noiß qe1sasqai ™n
b5ù, “do not intend materially the sayings of the prophets (...), nor do expect
to see
\Ishgörzn – this is probably the most difficult word of the epigram. The
verb œshgor6z (or œshgor6omai) is a legal term, indicating that someone has an
equal right to speak; the right to do so is called œshgor5a and the person who
enjoys this right is an œs8goroß. In the Life of Theodoros of Stoudios we read that
he and his followers were sent into exile because they had dared to speak out
freely against the emperor: ™p\ Ésø to ̄ lögoy parrhs5ô, “because of an equal
freedom of speech”^37. And in numerous other hagiographical texts we read that
the saint enjoyed the privilege of parrhs5a, “freedom of speech”, because he
was so close to God. This idea of saintly parrhs5a may account for the use of
the term œshgörzn to a certain extent, but it does not explain why the œs8goroi
have an equal right to speak. Equal to whom? In the word Ésoß and its various
derivatives there is always a point of comparison. By definition, “to be equal”
(^35) SPECK 1978: 619 (Mansi 336E). Cf. Mansi 352E–353A: p1nteß noer0ß t! noer) qeöthti
proskyno ̄men.
(^36) Ed. CICCOLELLA 2000b: 76 (vv. 3–4 and 9–12) and 80 (translation).
(^37) Ed. V. LATYŠEV, VV 21 (1914) 269.