THE U.S. AND IRAN
are moving closer
to confrontation.
In 2015, Iran signed
a deal with the U.S.,
Britain, France, Ger-
many, Russia and
China to limit its nuclear production in
exchange for the lifting of sanctions that
have crippled the nation’s economy. In
2018, former President Donald Trump
kept a campaign promise to pull the U.S.
out of the agreement, and Iran again
ramped up its nuclear activity. President
Joe Biden pledged to try to restore the
deal, but Iran—reluctant to negotiate
from a perceived position of weakness,
and angry that U.S. Presidents can so eas-
ily reverse their predecessors—is playing
hard to get.
Iran’s government has
said at various times that
it wants to revive the deal,
and the country’s Presi-
dent, Ebrahim Raisi, en-
tered offi ce in August with
a chance to seal a quick
agreement with Washington. He would
have had to accept limits on what Iran
insists is a peaceful nuclear- energy pro-
gram, but the lifting of sanctions would
allow Iran to sell much more of its oil and
other exports, helping to rebuild its bro-
ken economy. Instead, Iran has ramped
up its nuclear program in ways that re-
duce the “breakout time” needed for it to
build a nuclear weapon, and Raisi has of-
fered little at the negotiating table.
Diplomacy is now on hold, and pros-
pects for success are fading. The Biden
Administration has few options. The
chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan
has reduced the President’s tolerance for
risk-taking with Iran that will invite Re-
publican charges of appeasement. Israel,
which speaks of Iran’s nuclear program as
an existential threat, fears that Biden’s for-
eign policy focus on China and his deter-
mination to pivot America’s security focus
toward Asia will leave Israel alone, while
America’s Gulf allies are more concerned
about Iran’s proxy wars and cyber threats.The fi ght over the nuclear program
could have spillover implications for both
nations and the region. As hopes of re-
viving the nuclear deal fade, Iran will in-
sist on a more limited agreement. To try
to force that result, Iran will accumulate
more highly enriched uranium, deploy
more advanced centrifuges and test tech-
niques for turning uranium into metal that
can be used to make a bomb. As the Biden
Administration works with allies to dial up
more economic pressure, Iran may again
remind the world that it can strike ship-
ping in the Persian Gulf.THERE’S ALSO A RISK inside Iran that
continued economic misery will provoke
anti government protests, and if Raisi
doesn’t believe he should off er the nu-
clear concessions needed
to ease that pain, he may
instead create distractions
in the various Middle East
confl icts in which Iran
is directly or indirectly
involved—particularly in
Iraq and Yemen. Fear of
U.S.- Israeli strikes inside Iran that his gov-
ernment can’t eff ectively respond to will
prevent Raisi from crossing the ultimate
red line by building a bomb. Nor is Iran
likely to repeat its bold 2019 attack on
Saudi oil infrastructure, at least for now.
But Iran’s hard-line President has many
options short of that, which could again
raise security alerts and add upward pres-
sure on already high and rising oil prices.
There is also a continuing risk that
Israel will decide it must take military ac-
tion to stop Iran, with or without a nod
from Washington. More likely is the less
drastic, but still dangerous, step of Israeli
sabotage of Iranian nuclear and military
sites, which will provoke Iranian retalia-
tion, including in cyberspace. Miscalcula-
tion on either side could provoke a spiral-
ing confl ict.
The new Presidents of the U.S. and
Iran are both playing weak hands,
and that’s making it unexpectedly hard
to restore a deal that off ers big benefi ts
for both sides. THE RISK REPORT
Iran and the U.S. play their
weak hands over a chasm
By Ian BremmerMiscalculation on
either side could
provoke a
spiraling confl ictTheView Opener