Internet of Things Architecture

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Element to protect Risk D/R/E/A/D rating Examples of Causes Mitigation and relevant Design Choices (for the latter see

Section 5.2.10)

dealing with this threat (identification of compromised devices).

DC S.10: end-to-end encryption

DC A.16- 17 : autonomous security

Intermediary devices

behave maliciously and

clients are not able to

report the fact.

M/M/L/M/H

enforce weak security

Remote monitoring of intermediary devices.

Depending on the malicious action performed by intermediary devices,

client nodes may mitigate it by applying end-to-end security schemes (Key

Exchange and Management Functional Component + protocol security).

DC A.16- 17 : autonomous security

Information re-routing by

intermediary device.

M/H/M/M/M

enforce medium

security

End-to-end security scheme put in place by the Key Exchange and

Management Functional Component (see Section 4.2.2.7), and enforced

by the relevant protocol security function.

DC S.10: end-to-end encryption

Assisting intermediary

devices are no longer

usable.

L/M/H/H/L

enforce medium

security

• Exhaustion attacks


• Various specific attacks
  against the involved
  assistance mechanisms
  (e.g. no packet forwarding
  toward a routing service,
  replacing a received key
  fragment with garbage
  against a collaborative
  keying service...)

Denial-of-service detection / reaction scheme.

DC A.16- 17 : autonomous security

Backend services Administrator-role

usurpation

H/M/L/H/L

enforce medium

security

Administrator credentials

disclosed / hacked / brute-

forced

Not specifically targeted. Addressable through security management and

credentials management policies.