MODAL LOGIC
152of nature, implying it is a law of nature
that God not act in nature with special
intentions. A better definition is that M
is a miracle when M would not have
occurred without God’s agency, when M
has religious significance, and when M is
not part of God’s general willing of cos-
mic order.
MODAL LOGIC. Entailments involving
propositions that are possible, necessary,
or impossible. One claim in modal logic
is that if X is possibly necessary, X is nec-
essarily necessary. In philosophy of reli-
gion, modal logic is most often used in
debates over the ontological argument.
For example, in some versions of the
ontological argument it is argued that
God either exists necessarily or that God’s
existence is impossible. This premise is
sometimes supported as part of the thesis
that God has every great-making attri-
bute and that necessary existence would
be an excellence. Philosophers such as
Leibniz then go on to argue that it is
possible that God exists. If it is possible
that God exists, then God’s existence is
not impossible. If God’s existence is not
impossible, it is necessary. Hence, God
exists. Some detractors object that the
argument only establishes a hypothetical
judgment (if God exists, God exists
necessarily).
MOKSHA (a.k.a. Mukti). Sanskrit,
“release.” Moksha is a term used in Indian
religions to refer to the ultimate goal of
release or liberation from the cycle of
death and re-birth (samsara). It is similar
to the Buddhist concept of nirvana.MOLINA, LUIS DE (1535–1600). A
Spanish philosophical theologian most
noted for his theory of divine middle
knowledge (scientia media) which was
designed to reconcile the belief in divine
foreknowledge and freedom. According
to Molina, God knows what all creatures
would freely choose to do under all possi-
ble circumstances. By knowing which
circumstances obtain, God thereby
knows how a free creature acts. See also
MOLINISM.MOLINISM. A theory of divine knowl-
edge originated by the Jesuit theologian
Luis de Molina. What is distinctive about
the theory is its claim that God knows
certain propositions, now usually termed
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom
(CCFs). These are propositions concern-
ing each actual and possible free creature,
stating what that creature would choose
to do in any logically possible situation
of libertarian free choice with which
that creature might be confronted.
God’s knowledge of these propositions is
termed middle knowledge (scientia
media) because it is thought of as inter-
mediate between God’s “natural knowl-
edge” of necessary truths and God’s “free
knowledge” of truths that depend on