DIVINE SIMPLICITY
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while even denying their underlying
structure.
Divine command theories face the
worry that God’s commands may be free
and unconstrained. If God approved of
rape or murder or the sacrifice of a child
(see Genesis 22:1–19, the narrative of
Abraham and Isaac), would such acts be
morally required? Some reply by modify-
ing their account to make explicit God’s
essential goodness. In this framework,
God would not command murder, et al.
Some theists claim that God’s commands
have normative force due to God’s role as
Creator. If God creates and conserves a
good cosmos, do not creatures in some
sense belong to God and owe some alle-
giance to the Creator? On this view, God’s
commands have normative force due to
divine ownership.
DIVINE DISCOURSE. A term made
popular by Nicholas Wolterstorff to des-
ignate God’s revelation through human
language. Wolterstorff sees divine dis-
course as a phenomenon distinct from
revelation as a broader category in which
God may be disclosed without the use of
prepositions or sentences.
DIVINE SIMPLICITY. The teaching
that God is simple can be found in the
writings of authors such as Augustine of
Hippo, Anselm of Canterbury, and Thomas
of Aquinas. It was formally ratified by the
Fourth Lateran Council and the First
Vatican Council. In this context, “simple”
means “non-composite.”
Defenders of divine simplicity typi-
cally (though not always) note three ways
in which something might be thought to
be composite. In Aquinas’ terminology
(Aquinas being a particularly famous and
systematic defender of divine simplicity)
(1) it might be composed of “form” and
“matter,” (2) it might be composed of
“individuality” and “nature,” or (3) it
might be composed of “essence” and “exis-
tence.” The teaching that God is simple
(and even when expressed in terms other
than those used by Aquinas) denies that
God is composite in any of these ways.
It claims, therefore, that God is not a
physical body, not something which
undergoes any kind of change, not some-
thing belonging to a natural kind of which
there could be more than one member
(and, therefore, not something distin-
guishable from its nature, or sharing its
nature with anything), and not something
owing its existence (or way of existing) to
anything in any way.
Critics of the teaching that God is
simple commonly suggest that it involves
some absurd identity claims or that it
conflicts with the biblical account of
God. Its defenders argue that it is actually
implied by the biblical account and is
chiefly to be construed as a piece of nega-
tive theology (an account of what God is
not) rather than an attempt to describe
God in positive terms. The “big idea”