TheEconomistNovember6th 2021 BriefingSocialmobilityinAmerica 19to50%(seechartonthenextpage).
Thatremarkabledropisdowntoa few
longrunningtrends,especiallytheemer
genceofeducationasthedifferentiatorbe
tweeneconomicprecarityandsuccess.Na
tionalstatistics showthatworkerswith
collegedegreesnowhaverealwages86%
higher than those of workers without.
Whatismore,thosewithouta degreehave
seenlittleincreaseinrealwagessince1979.
Manylesseducatedmenhavedropped
outofthelabourforce.In 2016 “onlyone
intwolessskilledmeninruralAmerica
worked,whichwas 15 percentagepoints
lowerthaninmetroareas,”writesJames
Ziliak,aneconomistattheUniversityof
Kentucky.Realwagesthathavenotbudged
andlowerworkforce participationhave
gonehandinhandwithillhealth,which
worsensoutcomesfurther.AnneCaseand
AngusDeatonofPrincetonUniversityre
centlypublishedresearchshowingthatthe
life expectancy ofAmericans without a
bachelor’sdegreeisfalling.
Ontopofthisprecipitousdeclineinab
solutemobilitytherehavealsobeenlosses
inrelativemobility,a measurecomparing
children’spositionintheincomedistribu
tionwiththatoftheirparents.Consider
thechancefora childborntoparentsinthe
bottomfifthoftheincomedistributionto
makeittothetopfifth.Ina societywhere
originsdidnotmatteronewouldexpect
thelikelihoodofsucha ragstorichesas
centtobeclosetorandomchance,or20%.
InAmericathechanceisjust7.5%.
Comparisons with other countries
make this look particularly pernicious.
Thelandofopportunityisbadlyoutpaced
byEuropeanwelfarestatessuchasBritain,
FranceandSweden(wherethechanceis
above11%)andalsobyCanada.
Intergenerationaldisadvantageisespe
ciallystarkforblackAmericans—theyhave
onlyhalfasgooda chanceofescapingfrom
thebottomfifthaspoorwhitesdo.Onein
five black Americans is from a family
whichhasbeenmiredinthebottomfifth
ofincomedistributionforthreegenera
tions;forwhitesit isjustoneina hundred.
Thosebornrichin America,by con
trast,aremuchlikelierto stayrichthan
theircounterpartsinotheradvancedcoun
tries.Theirchildrenseehigherincomes,
too.Hereditarypersistenceinincomesisa
measure ofhow much you can predict
about two people’sincomes based ona
comparisonofwhattheirfathersearned.
BhashMazumder,aneconomistattheFed
eral ReserveBank ofChicago,calculates
thatifanAmerican’sfathermadetwiceas
muchashisneighbour’sfather,thenhe
wouldbeexpectedtomake60%morethan
hisneighbour.Thatismuchhigherthanif
theywereFrench(41%),German(32%) or
Danish(15%),thoughlessthanif theywere
Brazilians(70%).Wegottagetoutwhilewe’reyoung
Becausechildrenmustgrowupandenter
thelabourmarketbeforetheirrelativeper
formancecan be assessed,findings like
these are inevitably backwards looking;
themostrecentdataprovidedbystudiesof
intergenerational mobility come from
adultsborninthe1980sandenteringthe
labourmarketinthe2000s.Fewexperts,
though,imaginethatthetrendtolowerso
cialmobilitywillturnouttohavereversed
forlatercohorts.Atbestitmayhavepla
teaued;it couldwellhaveworsened.
Thereturnstohighereducation—and,
conversely, thepenaltiesforlow educa
tion—show littlesignof declining.Andhighly educated people are likely to be
marriedtoeachother,toraisechildrenin
stable marriages, to live near excellent
schoolsandtoinvesta lotinsupplement
ingtheirchildren’seducation.MilesCo
rak,anexpertonsocialmobility,argues
thatrisinginequalityalongthesedimen
sions“willmostlikelylowerthedegreeof
intergenerational earnings mobility for
thenextgenerationofAmericanscoming
ofageina morepolarisedlabourmarket”.
Onewayoftryingtoseewhetherthings
aremerelybadorgettingworseistolook
fora leadingindicatorofsocialmobility.
Someeconomiststhinkthatthiscanbe
providedbyinequalitylevels,thoughthe
matterisfarfromsettled.A chartknownas
theGreatGatsbycurveshowsanempirical
link, with countries where income in
equalityishighgoingontohavelowrates
ofsocialmobility.Thesamepatternhas
beenobservedwithinAmerica,too.States
withhighlevelsofinequality alsohave
worsemobilityoutcomes.
Themostinnovativerecentresearchon
this comes from Raj Chetty, Nathaniel
Hendren, Patrick Kline and Emmanuel
Saez.Theyuseddatafrommillionsoftax
returnstoproducea highresolutionim
ageofmobilityoutcomes(seemap).This
uncoveredwidevariationwithincities;the
amountofsocialmobilitycandependon
the neighbourhood, or even the block,
wherepeoplelive.Butit remainedinverse
ly related to inequality. Other factors—
suchasmorestablefamilystructure,bet
terschools,lowersegregation—werecor
relatedwithhigherupwardmobility.
Inequality is,unsurprisingly,particu
larlypersistentamongblackAmericans.In
September the Census Bureau reported
thatthetypicalincomeforwhitehouse
holds in 2020 was61% higherthan for
blackhouseholds—agapwhichhasbarely
changedsince1967,whenthedataseries
began.Theblackwhitewealthgapisun
changedaswell,ata ratioofonetoten.
Iftherelationshipbetweeninequality
andsocialmobilityiscausal,ratherthan
justcorrelational,itaugursillfortoday’s
youngAmericans.Since 1989 theFederal
Reservehasputoutquarterlydataonthe
distributionofnationalwealth.Itsmost
recentrelease,forthesecondquarterof
2021,showedforthefirsttimethatthetop
1%ofearners heldmorewealththanthe
middle60%.DatafromtheCongressional
BudgetOfficeshowthattheshareofna
tionalincometakenhomebythemiddle
60%ofearnersinAmericahasfallen,and
thattakenbythetop20%ofearnershas
risen.In 1979 themiddle60%tookhome
50.8%,aftertaxesandtransfers.In 2018
thatsharehadfallento45.1%—andthetop
20%hadgoneupto49%ofthetake.
Nocountrycanrealistically aspireto
theabsoluteequalityofopportunitythat
wouldliftsocialmobilitytoitstheoreticalSource:opportunityatlas.org *Bottomquartile †Basedonhouseholdincomeatage35,forallchildrenborn, 2014-Go mid-west, young man
Adult outcomes for children born to low-income parents*
By commuting zoneShare in top 2% of national income, % of total†3 5 7 11
Median. 13 15 20 30