20 Briefing Social mobility in America TheEconomistNovember6th 2021
maximum. But America could at least as
pire to a less imperfect distribution of op
portunity. Several tranches of policy that
are especially influential on rates of social
mobility are in areas in which America
happens to lag behind its rich peers.
The most obvious missed opportunity
is the lack of investment in earlychild
hood education programmes, and as well a
welfare state that does little to reduce in
come poverty among children. Those al
ready about to enter the labour force would
benefit from better tailored education and
training. A system of progressive taxation
can pay for it all. It can also lower poten
tially unhelpful wealth inequality, particu
larly through levies on inheritances.
Even a president with huge sway in
Congress would have to take his time pur
suing such reforms as far as they might go:
Denmark was not built in a day. Mr Biden is
no such president. Six months ago, when
the arpprovided for $1.9trn in new spend
ing, he seemed to labour under the illusion
that a Democratcontrolled Congress
would give him all he wished. The subse
quent strength of internal dissent has
shattered that illusion. That does not mean
a socialmobility agenda is off the table. It
does mean making a series of choices.Together we could break this trap
Start with the youngsters. “We have pretty
unambiguous evidence that more finan
cial resources [for families with small chil
dren] have lasting impacts on health and
wellbeing and intergenerational mobili
ty,” says Maya RossinSlater, a Stanford
economist. But before covid19 America
had one of the highest rates of child pover
ty in the oecd—almost triple Poland’s.
The reason for this is not a mystery. The
typical oecdcountry spends 2.1% of gdp
on child and family benefits; America
spends only 0.6%. As originally pitched,
Mr Biden’s “Build Back Better” agenda fea
tured a suite of policies intended to make
America much less of an outlier, including
a generous childtax credit that mimicked
the child allowances many Western coun
tries use to reduce poverty, universal pre
kindergarten and childcare subsidies.
This pillar of spending is not looking as
grand as advertised in the framework put
out by the White House on October 28th.
The expanded childtax credits which have
already reduced child poverty were part of
a stimulus package passed in March; as
things stand they will be extended for only
one more year. Universal prekindergarten
would be funded for six years, according to
the latest negotiations, as would a child
care subsidy programme. Universalist pro
grammes, including the childtax credit re
ceived by most families, were appealing
when the Biden administration was work
ing with an effective blank cheque. Choos
ing a universal but shortlived programmeover a targeted and permanent one is hard
er to justify. As it is, more will probably be
spent subsidising care homes for the elder
ly than on children.
Measures which might have improved
social mobility for those already in the
workplace are being pared back to some
thing much less consequential. The presi
dent had originally envisaged two years of
tuitionfree community college to every
American; spending $80bn on worker re
training; and the creation of a scheme for
paid family and medical leave (which
America is almost alone in the developed
world in lacking). All three proposals have
been jettisoned because of the objections
of some Democratic senators. There is now
roughly as much spending proposed for
highereducation and workplacetraining
($40bn) as there is on expanding Medicare
so as to better cope with deafness ($35bn).
The supports that remain in place are
helpful, but comparatively modest and
timelimited. The expanded earnedin
come tax credit, which tops up the wages of
workingclass Americans, would persist
for just another year. Subsidies that allow
workers to buy health insurance through
the exchanges set up by Obamacare would
persist for another four years. Thisisnotthestuffofthegibill,the
vauntedlegislationwhichofferedgener
ouseducationbenefitstosoldiersreturn
ingfromthesecondworldwar(thoughin
waysthatworkedtothedisadvantageof
blackveterans)andhelpedcreatethehigh
socialmobilityofJoeBiden’syouth.Noris
it thestuffoftheNewDeal,anexamplethe
administrationreachedforwhenitsug
gestedthatmassivepublicworksprojects
onclimatechangemitigationandinfra
structure building could providea new
kindofstablejobtotheworkingclasses.
MrBidenpromisedthat90%ofthesejobs
wouldnotrequireafouryeardegree.As
thespendingavailablefortheseproposals
hasshrunk,sotoohastheirchanceofin
stigatinga Rooseveltianmobilisation.
Convoluted as they are, the Democratic
spending plans look crystal clear com
pared with their plans to raise revenue.
Europeanstyle welfare states require
European levels of taxation. But Mr Biden
has promised that no family with an in
come of less than $400,000 will pay more
taxes. And the 5050 split in the Senate
means that Kyrsten Sinema, a Democratic
senator from Arizona, has been able to veto
conventional alternative ways of raising
revenue, like increasing rates of tax on cap
ital gains and corporate profits. No place left to hide
Gone too is a sensible proposal to elimi
nate a loophole allowing inherited assets
to escape capitalgains tax (which might
have raised $204bn). And some Democrats
are also threatening to kill the whole pro
posal unless a tax break allowing the de
duction of state and local taxes is reinstat
ed. That $90bn annual break overwhelm
ingly benefits the rich; (54% of benefits go
to the top 1% of earners).
As a result the president’s stalwarts
have grasped at more exotic revenuerais
ing schemes of a sort which should not be
designed on the fly, as they have been, and
which risk distorting incentives for invest
ment. Among these are a new minimum of
15% of tax on accounting profits for corpo
rations, a penalty for stock buybacks, and
newly created levies of 58% on house
holds earning more than $10m.
Bringing together all the president’s
ambitions in a single package would have
been hard enough even if the original
$4trn had been forthcoming. At half that, it
is impossible. And besides, very few Amer
icans understand what the unwieldy
whole is really meant to achieve. The
White House might profitably pare its am
bitions down to the investments most
suited to equalising opportunity for Amer
ica’s children. If it did so, it could at the
same time clarify its message. The presi
dent could claim thatthething he had at
least started to buildbackbetter was the
American Dream itself.nDownward mobility
United States, children earning more than their
parents at age 3, by year of birth, % of totalSource:“ThefadingAmericandream”, by Raj Chetty et al.100806040200
1940 8480706050
Year of child’s birth