The Economist November 6th 2021 29
The AmericasBrazilFrom hero to villain
B
razil usedto be one of the main pro-
tagonists in global climate talks, its pol-
iticians and wonks proposing all sorts of
new-fangled ways to boost greenery. No
longer. This week Jair Bolsonaro, the belea-
guered president, decided to eat gnocchi
with distant relatives in northern Italy
rather than attend cop26, the unclimate
conference in Glasgow. “Everyone would
throw stones at him,” explained Hamilton
Mourão, the vice-president.
The country’s record on climate change
is indeed dire. Since Mr Bolsonaro took of-
fice in 2019, the rate of deforestation is up
by 45%. Brazil’s total greenhouse-gas emis-
sions rose 9.5% last year, according to a
study sponsored by the Climate Observato-
ry, a network of 70 ngos and think-tanks,
even as emissions fell in the rest of the
world. But whereas Mr Bolsonaro once
seemed to relish his reputation as a pari-
ah—backing out of hosting cop25 in 2019
and picking a fight with Emmanuel Mac-
ron, the French president—he now seems
keen to try to improve his reputation. “I’mnot as bad as people say,” he told Angela
Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, when
she approached him at a g20 dinner in
Rome on October 30th, at which he was sit-
ting alone. Brazil’s cop26 delegation hopes
to convey the same message.
Last month, in an attempt to look
greener, the government announced two
climate-focused initiatives: a revamp of an
existing plan to encourage low-carbon ag-
riculture and a new green growth pro-
gramme, which is meant to generate jobs
in sustainable fields. In addition, on No-
vember 1st Joaquim Leite, the environment
minister, said that Brazil would increase its
target to cut emissions, to 50% by 2030
from their level in 2005, and bring forward
the year by which it plans to reach net-zero
emissions from 2060 to 2050, as manycountries have done. According to Leonar-
do Cleaver, the top negotiator, Brazil will be
“more flexible” on Article 6, a contentious
clause of the 2015 Paris agreement that lays
out rules for global carbon trading.
Environmentalists are not convinced.
Brazil wants all of the benefits and none of
the costs from cop26, says Caroline Prolo, a
lawyer. Most of the government’s plans for
meeting its targets are “vague promises
that contain the word ‘green’”, says Stela
Herschmann of the Climate Observatory.
Last year Brazil’s formal unpledge to cut
emissions (known as a nationally deter-
mined contribution, or ndc) put the coun-
try among a tiny minority that not only
failed to increase their ambitionsince the
Paris agreement in 2015, but did the oppo-
site. The CO 2 baseline was revised up-
wards, but the pledge remained the same.
Part of the problem is that the govern-
ment has a tendency to see itself as a vic-
tim. “Brazil is owed more than it is getting,”
says Mr Cleaver. This stance was estab-
lished well before Mr Bolsonaro took of-
fice. Like other developing countries it
chides the rich world for falling short of its
pledge, in 2009, of mobilising $100bn per
year by 2020 to help poor countries cut
emissions and adapt to climate change.
In its ndclast year, Brazil’s government
also made previously promised emissions
cuts conditional on receiving such pay-
ments (other countries have also done
this). It wrote that it would need “at leastS ÃO PAULO
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