The Economist November 6th 2021 37
ChinaTheCommunistPartyControl the present, control the past
I
n preparation for a third fiveyear
term as the Communist Party’s leader, Xi
Jinping has been changing the rules of pol
itics, business and society. He has also
been pursuing another project that he sees
as essential to his continued grip on pow
er: rewriting the history of the party itself.
Mr Xi wants to show his country that he is
indispensable, a political giant on a par
with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping who
is turning China into a global power by
building on their legacy.
On November 8th about 370 members
of the political and military elite will gath
er in Beijing for an annual fourday meeting of the party’s Central Committee. The
only advertised topic on their agenda is a
resolution on the party’s history. It will be
the third in the party’s 100year existence.
The first, in 1945, and the second, in 1981,
were triumphs for Mao and Deng respec
tively, consolidating their grip on power at
crucial junctures. Mr Xi’s ability to secure
one of his own suggests that he has quelledany meaningful opposition to extending
his rule at a party congress that is due to be
held late in 2022. The resolution will be “an
extraordinary demonstration of power”,
says Jude Blanchette of the Centre for Stra
tegic and International Studies, a think
tank in Washington.
The plenum is the secondtolast con
clave of the Central Committee before the
fiveyearly congress, and a crucial one for
setting its tone. Next year’s event will mark
a decade of Mr Xi’s leadership. By loosely
established convention, it would be his po
litical farewell. But he is all but certain to
secure another term. In the past year, once
again, he has been working hard to silence
critics and crush potential rivals, purging
the security apparatus, promoting political
allies and showing the party’s muscle by
unleashing regulators on big private firms.
Before the congress he will probably make
his choice (in secret) of replacements for
senior officials who are expected to retire
at a meeting of the national legislature in
March 2023. They include a new prime
minister and domesticsecurity chief.
The resolution on history has been cir
culated among senior officials, but its con
tents will not be made public until after the
plenum ends on November 11th. Speeches
by Mr Xi and the writings of official com
mentators offer clues. It is expected to cel
ebrate the party’s achievements, minimise
the horrors unleashed by Mao and suggest
that Mao, Deng and Mr Xi have shared the
same vision. The reigns of Mao and Deng
will be presented as essential preliminary
phases before the start of Mr Xi’s “new era”.
Mao helped the Chinese people “stand up”
after a century of humiliation by foreign
powers. Deng set China on a path to “get
rich” after centuries of poverty. Now Mr Xi
is helping China to “get strong”. The resolu
tion will hail Mr Xi’s judicious leadership
in managing social, economic and nation
alsecurity challenges, and suggest a con
tinuing need for his wisdom.
Mr Xi’s predecessors used history dif
ferently in their resolutions. In 1945 Mao
justified a purge of his enemies, blaming
them for past mistakes so he could posi
tion himself as the unquestioned leader. In
1981 Deng’s resolution said that Mao had
made serious mistakes and that the Cultur
al Revolution of 196676 had been a “grave
blunder”, causing chaos. By criticising
Mao, albeit cautiously, Deng rebuilt public
support for the party and freed his hand to
pursue freemarket reforms.
But history presents a different chal
lenge to Mr Xi. On the party’s left wing are
neoMaoists who have long agitated for a
restoration of their hero, and have criti
cised Deng, whom they blame for such pro
blems as corruption and inequality. On the
right are those who worry (very privately)
that China is sliding back towards a MaoXi Jinping is rewriting history to justify his rule for years to come→Alsointhissection
38 ThePentagononthe pla— Chaguan is away