38 China The Economist November 6th 2021
style dictatorship and losingitscommit
ment to Deng’s reforms.
Mr Xi has declared that neitherMaonor
Deng should be used to “negate”theother.
He does not want a historyfilledwithmis
takes and contradictions, noronethatrais
es questions about onemanrule.Hebe
lieves the collapse of the SovietUnionwas
hastened by a failure to protectthelegacies
of Lenin and Stalin. He hascampaigned
vigorously against “historicalnihilism”—
essentially anything that caststheparty’s
past in an unfavourable light.Tomesthat
excavate Mao’s worst mistakes,oncetoler
ated, are now strongly discouraged.
A new official history oftheparty,pub
lished in February, gives aglimpseofMr
Xi’s preferred approach. Ittouches only
briefly on the Cultural Revolution.Itdoes
not mention the famine caused by the
Great Leap Forward that killedtensofmil
lions, nor any casualties inthecrushingof
the prodemocracy protestsatTiananmen
Square in 1989. The sectiononMrXi’sten
ure takes up more than aquarterofthe
book. Mr Xi’s predecessors,HuJintaoand
Jiang Zemin, are given muchlessspace.
The new resolution will suggestthat
China needs Mr Xi in ordertofulfillong
term goals such as turning thecountryinto
a “great modern socialist nation”by 2035
and a “prosperous” and “strong”one by
2049, the 100th anniversaryofthePeople’s
Republic. It will probably mention his
“common prosperity” campaigntoreduce
inequality and his “dual circulation”strat
egy to make the economy moreresilientto
external shocks like the pandemic and
trade disputes with America.Itisexpected
to describe a grim internationalenviron
ment, though America anditsalliesmay
not be named. And it willprobablyrepeat
the party’s ritual languageaboutTaiwan,
saying it must be reunitedwiththemain
land. China’s failure to retakeTaiwanhas
been a sore point for everyleadersince
Mao. The resolution is suretomentionMr
Xi’s call for the “great revivaloftheChinese
nation” by 2049, which suggeststhathe
aims to secure reunificationbeforethen.A
specific promise is unlikely.
In anticipation of the plenum,thepro
paganda apparatus has beguncrankingout
fawning articles about Mr Xi’s wisdom,
hoping, it would seem, tofosterenthusi
asm for the idea that he willcarryonrul
ing. On November 1st People’sDaily, the
party’s mouthpiece, began publishinga se
ries of editorials under thetitle“Crucial
decisions in the new era”.Theyhailthe
party’s achievements sinceitwasfounded
in 1921, and praise Mr Xi’s contributionsto
them. From Mr Xi’s perspective,theresolu
tion “not only has to lookbackoverthe
past, but it has to look to thefuture”,says
Joseph Fewsmith of Boston University.
And according to Mr Fewsmith, Mr Xi
thinks, “The future, c’est moi.”nMilitarystrategyAn unpacific
contest
W
henamericaandtheSovietUnion
racedeachothertobuildeverlarger
nucleararsenalsduringthecoldwar,Chi
naambleddisdainfully.Itdidnotdetonate
itsfirstnuclearweaponuntil 1964 andkept
onlyafewhundredwarheads compared
withthetensofthousandspiledupbythe
superpowers.Tothisdayitmaintainsit
willneverbethefirsttousenukesina war.
Evenso,Chinaissprintingtocatchup.
In its latest annual assessment, the
PentagonsaysChina’sstockpileofnuclear
warheads,whichlastyearit reckonedtobe
inthe“low200s”,couldtripletoabout 700
by 2027 and willprobably quintuple to
1,000 ormore by 2030. That is sharply
higher than America’sprevious forecast
thatthearsenalwoulddoubleinsizeby
then.Thatwouldstillleaveitsmallerthan
America’sorRussia’s:thosecountrieseach
haveabout4,000warheads.
Thereport’sconclusionsexplainAmer
ica’salarmaboutChina’smilitarymodern
isation. Hitherto the greatestworry has
beenaboutitsconventionalarms,notably
itsgrowingabilitytooverwhelmandin
vadeTaiwan,andstopAmericafromcom
ing to the rescue. Now the anxiety is
spreadingtothenucleardomain.
Speculationaboutthenuclearbuildup
mountedinJuneandJuly,whenresearch
ersspottedthatChinawasbuildinghun
dredsofmissilesilosinGansu,a western
province,andinXinjiang,itsneighbour.
ThenthegeneralswerestunnedbyChina’s
testing ofa new weapon—a hypersonic
glidevehiclemountedona largerocket—that could deliver a nuclear warhead at
high speed while evading antimissile de
fences. The chairman of the joint chiefs of
staff, General Mark Milley, said it was close
to being a “Sputnik moment”—the shock
America felt when the Soviet Union sent
the first satellite into orbit in 1957.
The Pentagon believes China is build
ing fastbreeder reactors to make more
weaponsgrade plutonium; may already
have created a full “triad”, ie, the ability to
launch nuclear weapons from the land, sea
and air; and is expanding its earlywarning
systems, with help from Russia.
All told, China is shifting to a “launch
on warning” doctrine. Rather than rely on a
minimal deterrent to retaliate after an ini
tial nuclear attack, China would hence
forth fire at the first sign of an incoming
strike, even before the enemy warheads
have landed. This posture is akin to that of
America and Russia, notes James Acton of
the Carnegie Endowment, a thinktank in
Washington, “but increases the risk of in
advertent launch, such as a response to a
false warning”.
Some Chinese strategists have debated
moving to “mutual assured destruction”—
the doctrine that animated both super
powers in the cold war—and even have dis
cussed when it would make sense to be
first to use nuclear weapons. They have al
so considered lowyield weapons that
could be used in a limited manner, without
initiating allout nuclear war.
Why should China be building up its
nukes? After all, America and Russia this
year extended the New starttreaty, which
limits their arsenals. America is thinking
of reducing the role of nuclear weapons by
declaring that their “sole purpose” is to de
ter or retaliate against nuclear attack.
One reason is China’s worry that its ar
senal is too small to survive an American
first strike. Many of its warheads could be
destroyed by nuclear weapons or accurate
conventional missiles; any remaining
ones that are launched might then be taken
out by America’s antimissile systems.
China is modernising its landbased
missiles by building mobile launchers
with solidfuel rockets, which are easier to
hide and quicker to fire than older models.
It is also working on its triad. As well as de
ploying more nuclear submarines with
ballistic missiles, China has brought into
service the h6nbomber, which can also
launch such a weapon. And it has deployed
an earlier version of a hypersonic missile,
the df17 (pictured).
Xi Jinping, China’s leader, says he wants
to build a “worldclass” military force by
2049, the centenary of the Communist Par
ty’s takeover, as part of the “great revival of
the Chinese nation”. A powerful country, it
seems, musthavepowerful nuclear forces
to match—especially if it is going to stand
up to America.nWASHINGTON, DC
The Pentagon warns that China is fast
building up its nuclear arsenalHypersonic and hypervigilant