46 Europe TheEconomistNovember6th 2021
And it could struggle to meet the target. A
report to the cabinet on September 23rd re
vealed that at that point only 13 of the 51 ob
jectives had been reached.
Italy’s reform programme is not the
problem; that is ahead of schedule. In May
a package was approved that simplified a
wide range of bureaucratic procedures.
And a shakeup of the criminaljustice sys
tem is about to be implemented. A further
reform, focusing on civil justice, is in the
pipeline. Officials say that legislation to
promote competition is also coming soon.
The problem is with investment. The
outstanding footdraggers appear to be the
ministry of tourism, which at the time of
the report had yet to implement any of the
six investments for which it is responsible;
and the department for ecological trans
ition, which had implemented only one.
Looking beyond the end of this year,
two doubts arise. The first concerns the
fate of legislation after it is handed out for
implementation at the subnational level.
“In Italy, the intention of policies is all too
often lost in translation,” says Paolo Gra
ziano, who teaches political science at the
University of Padua. There is a shortage of
the necessary projectmanagement skills
among officials charged with implement
ing complex programmes—a shortcoming
the Draghi government says it has begun to
address. But another reason, says Fabrizio
Tassinari of the European University Insti
tute in Florence, is that “secondary legisla
tion becomes hostage to vested interests,
from local authorities to trade unions.”
A further doubt centres on Mr Draghi
himself. He is known to want the presiden
cy, which becomes vacant in February, and
if he were chosen he would have to resign
as prime minister. Even if he does not be
come head of state, he is unlikely to remain
in government after a general election that
has to be held by the spring of 2023, and
may well come sooner.
On October 18th mayoral candidates
from the Democratic Party (pd) were elect
ed in Rome and Turin, completing a clean
sweep of Italy’s biggest cities by the centre
left. But the pd and its allies are weaker in
the provinces. Polls continue to suggest
that Italy’s next government will be a co
alition dominated by two parties that have
long been critical of the European Com
mission: the Brothers of Italy (fdi) party,
which has links to neofascism, and the
hardright Northern League.
Those close to Mr Draghi argue that his
departure need not lead to a radical break.
His government has established bureau
cratic mechanisms for steering and con
trolling the flow of the recovery money
that will, with luck, outlive it. And future
governments will be just as constrained by
the deadlines the commission imposes
and loth to forfeit the flow of cash from
Brussels by failing to meet them.Perhaps.ButtheLeague,whichisa part
ofthecoalitionunderpinningMrDraghi,
andthefdi, whichisnot,arebothwedded
topoliciesandintereststhatareatodds
withthereformingthrustoftherecovery
plan.TheLeaguehasalreadysucceededin
parryingitinoneimportantarea.A signif
icantweaknessoftheItalianeconomyis
that,whiletaxesonlabouraretoohigh,
thoseonpropertyaretoolow.MrDraghi’s
governmentmovedtoadjustthebalance
bychangingthecriteriausedintheland
registryina waythatwouldhaveboosted
therevenuefromproperty.Butheraninto
determinedoppositionfromtheLeague’s
leader, Matteo Salvini. As a result, the
changeswillnotnowcomeintoeffectun
til2026;andeventhentheywillnotbe
usedtocalculatetaxliability.
“IammorepositivenowthanI wasa
yearago,”saysNicolaNobileofOxfordEco
nomics.“ButI stillconsidera permanent
improvement in Italy’s economic pros
pectstobeanupsidescenarioratherthana
basecase.”nThe rise of the Brothers
Italy, voting intention, main parties, %Source:Nationalpolls2403020100
2020 2021ForzaItaliaNorthern LeagueFiveStar
MovementDemocraticPartyBrothers
of ItalyPortugalThe contraption
crashes
A
geringonçaispleasing to say, but dif
ficult to operate. The Portuguese term,
sometimes translated as “contraption”, re
fers to a device patched together from odd
ly fitting parts. Although the governing ar
rangement that António Costa, Portugal’s
prime minister, assembled in 2015 was
dubbed the geringonça, it proved surpris
ingly durable. But on October 27th it finally
fell apart, as two leftwing partners voted
down his budget, triggering elections twoyears early—a rare occurrence in Portugal.
Though the budget was expansive,
splashing out on free kindergarten and
other goodies and increasing the mini
mum wage, it was not lavish enough for Mr
Costa’s radical allies, the Portuguese Com
munist Party (pcp) and the Left Bloc (be).
Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, the president,
had announced in advance that if it failed,
he would call elections. If he was hoping to
put pressure on the parties to seal the deal,
the gamble failed.
The parties are scrambling to influence
the electoral timetable. Most want elec
tions on January 16th, to avoid prolonged
instability. But the calendar is complicated
by the plans of the biggest opposition par
ty, the Social Democrats (psd), a centre
right outfit despite its name, to hold lead
ership elections on December 4th. That
would leave the winner scant time to pick
candidates for the general elections. One
psd candidate, Paulo Rangel, is lobbying
Mr Rebelo de Sousa (who hails from the
psd himself ) to hold the elections later, to
allow the party time to regroup. The cur
rent leader, Rui Rio, wants to postpone the
primary instead. The president was due to
announce the date on November 4th.
After an inauspicious start Mr Costa has
won respect, not least in neighbouring
Spain (where the centreleft Socialists also
depend on a farleft party, Podemos). His
Socialists came second in 2015’s election,
then toppled the shortlived minority psd
government, cobbling together a majority
with the beand pcp, previously considered
untouchable by the moderate Socialists.
The thenpresident required a written
agreement between the parties: the be and
pcp never joined the government but made
clear commitments of support. But Mr
Costa increased his party’s seat count in
2019’s elections. Mr Rebelo de Sousa decid
ed not to insist on a formal agreement be
fore blessing the second geringonça. The
Bloc and the Communists, weakened and
unbound by any deal, were sure to flounce
out at some point.
Some think Mr Costa might have been
happy for them to do so now. Portugal’s co
vid19 vaccination rate, 87%, is one of the
world’s highest. He can point to decent gdp
growth and falling unemployment until
the pandemic (which in 2020 caused gdp
to plunge further than in any year since the
1930s). He has kept the deficit, which made
Portugal a ward of the European Union and
the imf after the financial crisis, low
enough to win international respect.
But this has come at the cost of public
investment: Portugal’s is thought to be the
lowest in the eu in 2020 and 2021. Salaries
are low by Western European standards:
the minimum wage, at €775 ($900) a
month, is around €300 less than Spain’s.
Many Portuguese head abroad to work.
If Mr Costa nonetheless does well, heLISBON
Snap elections are called after the
prime minister’s allies desert him