64 Finance&economics TheEconomistNovember6th 2021
unwindingofstimulus.Yetthereisalso
causetothinkthateachwillnotundercut
therecovery,andthatgrowthmomentum
mayremainstrong.
Easilythemostpositiveeconomicde
velopmentofthepastyearhasbeenthere
markabledeclineinunemployment.After
a recessionthelabourmarketusuallytakes
yearstoheal.Thingslookedgrimatthe
heightofthepandemic,whenunemploy
ment soared to 14.7%, the highest rate
since the Depression.Yet thereturn to
work,albeitnottooffices,hasbeenaston
ishinglystrong.Theunemploymentrate,
4.8%inSeptember,islowforthispointina
recovery(seechart1 onpreviouspage).
Indeed,thefocusnowisonhowhardit
isforcompaniestohireworkers,especial
lyforbluecollarjobs.Thatmightsuggest
thattherecoveryisnearinganend,with
theeconomy strainingat itslimits. Yet
someslackremains.About3mpeople,2%
oftheprepandemiclabourforce,havestill
toreturntowork.Somemayhaveretired
early,butmanyareonthesidelines,con
cernedaboutchildcareandcatchingco
vid19.As thoseconcerns diminish—the
returntoschoolhasgonewellsofarand
vaccinesareprovingeffectiveagainstse
vereillness—suchpeopleare,littlebylit
tle,resumingwork.
Thesurgeininflationpresentsanother
bigworryabouttherecovery(seechart2).
Thepersonal consumptionexpenditures
priceindex,theFed’spreferredgauge,in
creasedby4.4%inSeptemberfroma year
earlier,themostinmorethanthreede
cades.FormuchofthepastyearofficialsattheFedandmanyothereconomists,too,
havearguedthatinflationistransitory,an
outgrowthofgummedupsupplychains.
Thetightjobmarket,however,compli
catesthepicture.Wagesroseby1.5%inthe
thirdquartercomparedwiththesecond,
thebiggestgaininatleasttwodecades.
Welcomeasitistoseenursesandwaiters
getpaybumps,thefearisthatrisingwages
willleadtoyetmoreupwardpressureon
pricesandultimatelytoa dreadedwage
pricespiral,asexperiencedinthe1970s.
Butconditionsareverydifferent.Farfewer
workersarerepresentedbyunionstoday,
andfarfewercontractshavecostofliving
adjustmentsbakedintothem.Thatshould
weakenthelinkbetweeninflationandpay.
TheFedmayhavebeenundulyoptimistic
in thinking that price pressures would
quicklysubside,butitslogicremainsper
suasive.Assupplychainsslowlyreturnto
normalandaspeoplereenterthelabour
force, inflationshould ebbwithout the
needforforcefulinterestraterises.
Relatedtothatisthefinalbigconcern:
thewithdrawalofstimulus.Withthefiscal
deficithitting15%ofgdpin2020,thehigh
estlevelsincethesecondworldwar,the
comedownwasboundtobepainful.The
shifttosmallerdeficitswilldeductabout
2.5percentagepointsfromgrowthoverthe
nextyear,easilythebiggestfiscaldragof
the past two decades, according to the
HutchinsCentreonFiscalandMonetary
PolicyinWashington(seechart3).
Themonetarycliffwillnotbeassteep,
butitnowloomsovertheeconomy.The
nextquestionaftertaperingiswhenthe
Fed willraiseinterestrates. OnOctober
29thGoldmanSachs,a bank,saidthatthe
firstraterisecouldcomeassoonasJuly,a
fullyearearlierthanit hadpreviouslyfore
cast,becauseofitsexpectationthatinfla
tionwillremainelevated.
Anendtostimuluswouldusuallyau
gur poorlyfor growth.Yet otherfactors
could insulate the economy. The con
sumption ofgoods isabout15% higher
thanitstrendlevel,partlybecausepeoplehavespentmuchlessmoneythanusualon
holidaysandrestaurantsandmuchmore
onfurniture,exercisebikesandstayat
homeessentials. Butwiththepandemic
nowapparentlypeteringout,peopleare
buying experiences again—a fillip for
growth, given that services account for
nearly80%ofoutput.
Even without any more stimulus
cheques, momentum for spending is
strong.JayBrysonofWellsFargo,another
bank,saysthatthestrengthofhousehold
balancesheets should be the starting
pointinanyanalysisofAmerica’sgrowth
prospects.Personaldebtobligationsasa
shareofdisposableincomeareneartheir
lowestonrecord.Businessinventoriesare
alsonearalltimelows,implyingsubstan
tialneedforrestocking,ifonlycompanies
can get the goods they need on ti
“KnowingwhatI knowtoday,I would
thatwearestillintheearlystagesoft
recovery,”saysMrBryson.
MrYeagerhasreacheda similarconclu
sion. As retailers rush to restock their
shelves,Hub’sorderbooksarefilling up
fast.Ithasevenhadtoturnsomeprospec
tiveclientsaway.“Wethinkthestrength
reallydoescarrythroughtotheendofnext
yearandpotentiallybeyond,”hesays.nWhat a drag
United States, contribution of fiscal policy
to quarterly GDP growth*, %Source: Hutchins Centre on Fiscal and Monetary Policy*At an annual rateFORECAST3151050-5
2322212019182017Returning to form
United StatesSources:BEA;HaverAnalytics;TheEconomist*Basedonaveragequarterlygrowthrateforthefiveyears
priortothepandemic †2012prices ‡Privatenon-residential
fixedinvestment §Personalconsumptionexpenditures21296321192017Consumption,$trn†ServicesGoods222018162221192017GDP, $trn†4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5211920172015-1averagePCE§ price index, %
increase on a year earlierBusinessinvestment‡
$trn†Actual Pre-covid trend*5 4 3 2 1 021192017InterestratesBond markets v
central banks
F
or muchof the past two years, central
bankers have found themselves playing
second fiddle to governments. With inter
est rates in the rich world near or below ze
ro even before the pandemic, surges in
public spending were needed to see econo
mies through lockdowns. Now central
bankers are firmly in the limelight. During
the past month, as inflation has soared, in
vestors have rapidly brought forward their
expectations for the date at which interest
rates will rise, testing policymakers’ prom
ises to keep rates low.
The expected date of liftoff in some
countries is now years earlier. In the last
days of October Australia’s twoyear gov
ernmentbond yield jumped from around
0.1% to nearly 0.8%, roughly the level at
which fiveyear bonds had traded as re
cently as September, prompting the central
bank to throw in the towel on its pledge to
keep threeyear yields ultralow. The bank
formally ditched its policy of yieldcurve
control on November 2nd, though it said it
would wait for sustained inflation to
emerge before raising interest rates.H ONG KONG
Investors bet that policymakers will
have to break their promises