66 Finance & economics TheEconomistNovember6th 2021
ital outflows and a tumbling lira (see
chart). The sinking currency, by raising the
cost of imports, has helped push up infla
tion by about eight percentage points over
the past year, to a rate around four times
the central bank’s target.
Brazil demonstrates how inflation can
get out of hand despite the best efforts of a
central bank, because of fiscal woes. After
suffering hyperinflation in the early 1990s,
when the annual inflation rate approached
3,000%, Brazil placed itself on a firmer
macroeconomic footing by adopting bud
get reforms and enhancing the central
bank’s independence. But from 2014 to
2016, and again over the past year, the abil
ity of the central bank to fight inflation has
been threatened by an erosion of confi
dence in the public finances.
Government spending in Brazil has
surged since the onset of the pandemic.
Jair Bolsonaro, the president, plans to ex
tend relief payments despite roaring infla
tion. Worries about debt sustainability
have reduced investors’ confidence, lead
ing to falling asset prices and a weaker cur
rency. Despite booming foreign demand
for Brazil’s commodity exports, the real has
tumbled by nearly 30% since the begin
ning of 2020.
Higher import prices have contributed
to stubbornly high inflation, forcing the
central bank to raise its benchmark inter
est rate by nearly six percentage points
since March. Yet interest rates may be ap
proaching levels at which the additional
fiscal cost they impose on the government
exacerbates debtsustainability worries
and further weakens the currency, leaving
the central bank in a nowin situation. The
real has dropped by nearly 2.5% since late
October alone—after the central bank
raised interest rates by a full 1.5 percentage
points and promised to do the same again
at its next meeting in December.
What happens if neither monetary nor
fiscal policy can be counted upon for economic discipline? Here Argentina provides
an illustration. The government has long
relied on the printing press to cover budget
deficits, and has been in particular need of
monetary financing since defaulting on its
debt, for the ninth time in its history, in
May 2020. Over the past two years the
amount of money in circulation has risen
at an average annual rate of more than
50%. The peso has fallen by over 60%
against the dollar since the beginning of
last year.
Argentina, like Brazil, has experienced
hyperinflation in recent times. Its eco
nomic situation may yet be salvaged. But
as policymakers in rich and poor countries
alike confront the enormous economic
and budgetary costs of covid19, some may
be tempted to depart from norms around
monetary and fiscal policy.The result, in
some unhappy places,couldbe inflation
that is too hot to handle. nMore money, more problemsSources:CentralBankofArgentina;IMF; Haver Analytics300
250
200
150
100
50
2019 20 21Monetary base, currency in circulation
January 2019=100ArgentinaTu rke yBrazilExchange rates against the $
% decrease, Jan 1st 2020-Oct 1st 2021ArgentinaTu r ke yBrazil-40-50-60 -20-30 -10 0Up, up and awaySignuptoourweeklynewsletter,
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http://www.economist.com /moneytalksPaymentsinAfricaTurf wars
T
he paymentsfrenzy is going global,
and Africa is catching the bug. So far
this year four of the continent’s financial
technology firms have reached or exceeded
billiondollar valuations, more than dou
bling Africa’s population of “unicorns”.
OPay, a mobilepayments company, ac
quired its horn in August, after raising
funding from investors including Soft
Bank, a Japanese firm. Other recent uni
corns include Wave, a Senegalbased start
up that runs a mobilemoney network;
Chipper Cash, which offers peertopeer
payments; and Flutterwave, which simpli
fies payments for businesses. As foreign
investment pours in, Africa’s fintech firms
are expanding both across the continent
and into new services.
Africa is an obvious choice for fintech
investors. They are betting that young Afri
can talent can innovate its way out of the
region’s most pressing financial problems
faster than legacy firms can. By 2025 the
continent will be home to 1.5bn people,
most of whom will have grown up in the
era of the internet. Nigeria, which has re
ceived almost twothirds of Africa’s fintech
investments this year, has a young and en
trepreneurial population. But more than
half of Nigerians do not have a bank ac
count. Across the continent, digitally liter
ate unbanked (and underbanked) people,
who have long been largely ignored by con
ventional lenders, are instead turning to
the upstarts. In Ivory Coast, for example,
94% of pupils’ school fees were being paid
using mobile money by 2014. This makes it
fertile territory for companies like Wave,
which moved into the country in April.
One reason for firms to expand geo
graphically stems from the African Conti
nental Free Trade Area, a deal that was first
agreed on in 2018 and which has now been
ratified by 38 countries. The PanAfrican
Payment and Settlement System was
launched in September as part of the deal,
in order to make the region’s many sys
tems work better together. As a conse
quence, investors are backing firms with
ambitions that extend beyond their home
countries. Flutterwave had reached more
than 33 African countries by the time of its
latest funding round this year; those takFintech firms vie for domination