The Economist October 30th 2021 China 71treated as sex objects,subservienttomen.
The legal system stillfavoursharassers.
The burden of proofisveryhighforwomen
who make accusationsofsexualassault.
An analysis of civilcasesbetween 2018 and
2020 by scholarsatYaleLawSchoolfound
that more than 90%ofthoseinvolvingsex
ual harassmenthadbeenbroughtbyal
leged perpetratorsagainsttheiraccusers
(for slanderingthem)ortheiremployers
(for discipliningthem).
In Septembera courtinBeijingrejected
a woman’s petitionforredress,whichhad
become the country’smostfamouscasere
lating to sexualharassment.Theplaintiff
had accused a wellknowntelevisionan
chor of gropingandforciblykissing her
when she was anintern.Thejudgesaidshe
had insufficient evidence. The plaintiff,
known as Xianzi,planstoappeal.Thever
dict, she says, hasmadeit “veryeasyforthe
public to assumeI waslying”.
In contrast tothecaseinvolvingAliba
ba’s employee,journalistsatstatemedia
were banned fromreportingonXianzi’s
plea. In the weekleadinguptotheverdict,
anyone who postedinformationaboutthe
case had their socialmediaaccountsfro
zen. Xianzi’s ownsuchaccountswerepar
tially or fully blocked.
Such experiencesarecommonamong
outspoken feministsinChina.Byshutting
them out of socialmedia,whiletolerating
the rantings of theircritics,censorsfanthe
flames of bigotry.Womenwhotrytoshare
their experiences of being sexually ha
rassed in the officeorbeingrequiredto
drink large quantitiesofalcoholatwork
banquets, are often “slutshamed or la
belled as antigovernmentorashostilefor
eign forces”, saysXianzi.
Antifeministsentimentisfuelled by
the party’s conservatism.XiJinpingtriesto
project an aura ofmasculinity(hisattacks
on showbiz havealsoincludeda banonef
feminate men appearingontelevision).He
is fawningly knowninChinaas“XiDada”,
literally meaning“UncleXi”.Hepromotes
traditional Confucianvalues,whichem
phasise the role ofwomen as obedient
wives and mothers.
Online trolls whoattack #MeToouse
the same authoritarian, jingoistic lan
guage that the partydelightsin,notesMs
Lu, the feministinAmerica.Theyalsoen
gage in a kind ofgrassrootsactivism,with
their numerous socialmedia accounts
and independentwebsitesthatspiceup
the party’s messagewithextradashesof
antiliberal vitriol.Thatistheonlysortof
advocacy allowed.n
MediacontrolsAll the news that’s fit to reprint
T
he communist party’s leadership,
with “Comrade Xi Jinping at the core”,
attaches “great importance” to managing
internet content. So declared the govern
ment on October 20th when unveiling new
instructions about what news could be re
published online. This was an understate
ment. Under the party’s rule, China’s press
has never enjoyed more than a small mod
icum of freedom. Mr Xi has relentlessly
tightened controls. Reporters and editors
deemed politically wayward have been dis
ciplined, fired or jailed.
The new directive, issued by the Cyber
space Administration of China (cac), up
dates a list, first published in 2016, of news
sources that other websites may republish.
cacsaid the revision was aimed at “reso
lutely closing the ‘back door’ on illegal
newsgathering and redistribution”.
The list names 1,358 approved outlets.
That is nearly four times as many as were
named in the previous one. It is not a sign
of relaxation. The larger number merely
reflects the proliferation of news websites
run by stateowned media. More impor
tant to note are sources that are no longer
listed. The most conspicuous is Caixin On
line, a popular and trusted website.
Since its launch in 2009, Caixin Online
has been an outlier in China’s drab media
landscape. It often goes far beyond other
outlets with investigative reporting and
coverage of topics such as corruption, en
vironmental problems and touchy policy
debates. In the early stages of the pandem
ic it called into question the official death
toll in Wuhan, pointing to an unusual
workload at crematoria. Its founder, HuShuli, previously ran amagazine called
Caijing, which once occupied a similar
niche. Ms Hu is politically wellconnected
and has a keen sense of how to skate close
to—but rarely over—the party’s red lines.
She and her colleagues may feel the ef
fects of another recent tightening of the
party’s grip. On October 8th China’s plan
ning agency, the National Development
and Reform Commission (ndrc), released
a draft regulation reiterating a ban on priv
ate investment in most news operations.
Such restrictions have been in place since
at least 2005, but have not been rigorously
enforced. State media suggest that this
time, change is afoot. According to one
widely quoted Chinese expert, previously
noncompliant arrangements will be
”cleaned up”. It will be a big job. Like Cai
xin, many Chinese media, though fully op
erated and controlled by the state, have
complex ownership structures that in
clude big holdings by private investors.
Progovernment commentators have
praised the party’s resolve. Sima Nan, a
blogger in Beijing with more than 2.4m fol
lowers on Sina Weibo, a Twitterlike plat
form, opined that a loosening of media
controls in the Soviet Union had hastened
its collapse in 1991. “This is an ideological
struggle,” he said, comparing the ndrc‘s
ban to “removing firewood from under a
cauldron”—a common way in Chinese of
describing drastic action taken to deal with
an emergency.
Sina Weibo is owned by Sina Corpora
tion, a nonstate tech giant.Butit is clear
that the ndrcdoes not havenewsanalysts
such as Mr Sima in its sights.nB EIJING
State-controlled news organisations are put on an even shorter leashVacancyThe Economist is hiring a correspondent to
write about China. We are looking for someone who
can read and speak Chinese, has excellent writing
skills in English and is a sharp analyst. Location
negotiable. Please send a cvand an unpublished
600-word article on a topic related to China
to [email protected] by November 30th.