50 Europe The Economist October 30th 2021
Goingnuclear
B
efore theeuro, Schengen, “Ode to Joy”, butter mountains and
the Maastricht treaty, there was the atom. “The peaceful atom”,
wrote Jean Monnet, the cognac salesman turned founding father
of the eu, was to be “the spearhead for the unification of Europe”.
Europe was a nuclear project before it was much else. In 1957 the
eu’s founding members signed the Treaty of Rome to form the
European Economic Community, the club’s forebear. At the same
time they put their names to a less wellknown organisation: Eur
atom, which would oversee nuclear power on the continent. The
idea of the common market was nebulous; the potential of nuclear
energy was clear.
Where nuclear power was once a source of unity for Europe, to
day it is a source of discord. The common market morphed into
the euof today, while Euratom became a backwater. Of the eu’s 27
countries, only 13 produce nuclear power. Some ban it. France and
Germany, the two countries that dominate eupolicymaking, find
themselves directly opposed. France generates over 70% of its
power from nuclear reactors. Germany has pledged to close all its
nuclear power plants by 2022. For France and its atomic allies, nu
clear energy has a bright future. For Germany and its sceptic kin,
the technology is an unhealthy past.
It is against this backdrop that the euhas to answer a question.
Is nuclear power green (since it emits very little carbon dioxide) or
not (because nuclear accidents, though extremely rare, are dan
gerous)? Green industries face a life of subsidies and cheap capital
as governments tighten investment rules elsewhere. Their dirty
counterparts face a tougher life. How the euis managing the deci
sion reveals a lot about the club.
Take the politics of it. With the FrancoGerman engine sputter
ing on nuclear policy, unlikely alliances have formed. France and
the likes of Poland and the Czech Republic are usually sparring
partners. French politicians generally see the region as an expen
sive appendage and a source of labour that undercuts French
workers. Countries in eastern Europe see the French as protec
tionists who suck up to Russia. Yet when it comes to nuclear pow
er the two are firm pals. It is tempting to carve the euinto simple
blocs, whether Club Med or the Frugals. The reality of European
politics is kaleidoscopic. Nuclear power is no exception. Inthis debate, Germany is likely to be on the losing side. It gave
up on nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster in 2011, when an
earthquake and tsunami caused a meltdown in Japan. Angela Mer
kel vowed to ban it in barely a decade. Countries from Belgium to
Bulgaria followed, scrapping plans to build nuclear power stations
and pledging to switch others off. However, opinions have shifted.
Germany knows it does not have the votes to stop nuclear power
being rated as green. Austria and Luxembourg would probably
join it on the barricades, but few others will. For a supposed hege
mon, Germany is not especially hegemonic.
At the same time France is increasingly influential. Europe fall
ing back in love with nuclear power is just one example of the ma
ny policy debates heading in a French direction. On everything
from industrial policy, where the club is now enthusiastically diri-
giste, to expansive rhetoric on foreign policy, the eu is speaking
French. (Although France’s quest to get the club to make more use
of the French language is failing.) Nuclear power is another debate
in which Paris gets its way.
Whatever the topic, the euis a dealmaking machine, with con
sensus forged via a mix of bribery, blackmail and backscratching.
Gas power is undergoing the same kinds of debate as nuclear pow
er. While gas generates carbon emissions, it is cleaner than coal,
argue its supporters. Some countries are pronuclear and antigas;
others are the reverse. Some oppose both, while some demand
both. Ostensibly the topics are separate. In reality, they are wed
ded in the minds of national governments and meps who have fi
nal approval. Overlapping interests are played off against each
other in a compromise that will, at best, leave almost everyone
equally unhappy.
If the politics are linked, so are the policy consequences. Take
another neuralgic debate: reform of the eu’s spending rules. A
likely compromise is that while stiff rules could remain for day
today spending, countries could be able to spend more freely in
the name of the green transition. If nuclear power is labelled green
in the private sector, it becomes harder to avoid a similar designa
tion when it comes to public money. German voters may end up
looking across the Rhine and seeing their French neighbours
splashing cash on energy they see as dangerous.
Politics permeates every euinstitution. On paper the European
Commission, which makes the initial decision on how to treat nu
clear power, is full of civil servants who offer technocratic an
swers. In practice, they know the question of nuclear power is po
litical. They also know that life will be easier if they answer it
quickly, preferably before a new German government containing a
virulently antinuclear Green party is formed. Mrs Merkel can
leave office with another compromise to her name; the incoming
Greens can come to power and blame the previous government for
a fait accompli. Machiavelli was a civil servant, after all. Clean energy requires dirty deals
Nuclear policy is a reminder that fates in the euare bound togeth
er, whether the topic is energy, the environment or the economy.
As the eu’s energy market integrates, those countries that pride
themselves on only using the cleanest energy will benefit from
those that rely on more debatable sources. The euis an increas
ingly homogenous beast, with fewer carveouts for those who
want to do things differently. Collective decisions have collective
outcomes. “To approach our atomic future separately...would have
been insane,” wrote Monnet. The euwill approachitsatomic fu
ture together, whether some countries like it or not.nCharlemagne
Nuclear energy once bound Europe together. Now it is dividing the club