158 Chapter 6
perception, bolstered by political rhetoric from both the U.S. and
Cuban governments, persists despite the fact that the U.S. embargo
today is an imperfect blockade. Since the mid-1990s Cuba trades
actively with over 166 countries (Pérez-Stable 2003: 14) and the U.S.
itself is the country’s 7th largest trading partner (Mesa-Lago 2007).
However, in recent years the effect of the embargo has been felt at a
personal level, particularly in the bite of the restrictions that operated
between June 2004 and April 2009 which limited Cubans in the U.S. to
visiting immediate family on the island more than once every three
years, and sending a maximum of $1,000 in remittances per family
member per year (Human Rights Watch 2005; Sullivan 2009: 6).
The surveys are also striking in that “lack of political freedom” is
listed as a priority only occasionally, and by small percentages of the
population. The MCL’s primary focus is on these important yet less
popular political issues, from the priority emphasis on the political
prisoners, to the emphasis on goals such as free elections, freedom of
association, and freedom of expression (Payá 1998). In the surveys, it
is freedom of movement and freedom of expression—more person-
ally oriented freedoms—that resonate most widely. The government
has tried to assert itself in the area of freedom of expression, with
Raúl Castro calling for “critical debate” (Castro 2007). Some changes
have occurred, as Cubans with sufficient money can now purchase
computers and cellular phones and can now enter hotels) (BBC World
News 21 May 2008). However, the initial rush of expectation has been
dampened by news that fundamental changes are still being post-
poned, and that instances of public critique or serious opposition con-
tinue to be dealt with heavy-handedly, a tactic reminiscent of the
crackdown that followed hints of reform in the early 1990s (Human
Rights Watch 2009; Corrales 2004: 39).
Not surprisingly, the consistently disappointing results of failed
past efforts to deliver the key reforms long-sought by reformers and
dissidents has fed skepticism and sapped Cuban reserves of hopeful-
ness and optimism with regard to politics, leaving behind a “residue”
of pessimism (Lederach 2005: 51). The status quo, dissatisfying