160 Chapter 6
the MCL cannot successfully compete against the government. How-
ever, the legislative agenda and the Varela Project are strong building
blocks for such an alternative.
FINAL CONCLUSIONS: THE POTENTIAL OF LEGAL
DISSENT
The constructive engagement policies that supported Pope John Paul
II’s 1998 visit to Cuba contributed to the liberation of nearly 300
political prisoners (Pérez-Stable 2003: 78) and opened a political space
in which over 25,000 of people were inspired and empowered to take
action by signing the Varela Project. The presentation of signatures in
2002 was an undisputed success for the dissidents and their support-
ers, and even today, Cuba’s legislature has not discharged its constitu-
tional duty to discuss the project.
Similarly, Barack Obama’s election after an inspiring campaign that
emphasized change, hope, modern-day civil rights and individual par-
ticipation, his commitment to constructive engagement, and his initial
gestures have attracted attention in Cuba. Questions remain: How can
Obama and U.S. policy help create conditions for the release of the
political prisoners, who are otherwise at risk of wasting their potential
and lives by serving out their sentences in full, while publicly validat-
ing the content of the proposals for which they went to jail? How can
U.S. policy contribute to creating an environment where Cuba's politi-
cal reformers are willing, so to speak, to come out of the closet, and
implement substantial and sustainable structural reforms? The role of
international actors in creating the “boomerang effect,” and amplify-
ing the content of the proposals of principled domestic movements
such as the MCL is a valuable and legitimate one.
Reality must temper expectations. Spontaneous, bottom up change
in Cuba in the form of a mass grassroots movement is unlikely. Sur-
veys show that despite high rates of dissatisfaction, people are focused
on issues of day-to-day survival, not deep political restructuring. Top-