60 Chapter 2
Nevertheless, it would be ingenuous to think that in the short term
the current Cuban model will remain unscathed and that it is exempt
from deformations, some of them copied from “real socialism” and
others that have emerged in an economy under the rule of hard cur-
rency with growing inequalities and corruption. Actually, the model
has suffered substantial modifications, but the Cuban leadership is try-
ing to preserve the achievements of socialism. Nevertheless, the
changes that have occurred since 1989 have been turning Cuban
socialism into a society with less equity than before. What is not clear
is whether the social cost of the economic reform is making the sys-
tem more productive. Apparently, this is happening only in the tourist
enclaves and other areas where there is foreign capital and economic
units operate with hard currency. At the same time, there is efficiency
in some state enterprises, mainly those managed by former members
of the armed forces.
Is it possible that the hostile U.S. policies and the strategic mistakes
committed by the Cuban Revolution, such as the revolutionary offen-
sive of 1968 and the delay of urgent changes, will return the country
to the dependent capitalism that reigned in 1959?^41 Would this transi-
tion to capitalism be peaceful or through an invasion? Will Washing-
ton and the right-wing sectors of Miami be able to frustrate the
dreams of José Martí, Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, the Cuban people,
and the new generations? Is victory possible for the line of historical
thought that has asserted since the nineteenth century that Cuba can-
not be fully independent—that dependence on the United States is
both more profitable for the island and unavoidable in geopolitical
terms?
The long tradition of struggle of the Cuban people is not in har-
mony with this notion. The island will not go back to dependent capi-
talism, lack of sovereignty, and all the inequalities and injustices of
Cuban society before the revolution. Transformation toward a twenty-
- The revolutionary offensive of 1968 practically eliminated small private businesses.
A small group of independent workers was authorized, and 30 percent of the land was
left in private hands with its owners required to sell their production to the state.