Parameters, Uncertainty and Recognition: The Politics of Culture in Cuba 67
ing auto-criticism): he is both the power and the opposition. Over the past
twenty years it has been increasingly possible to criticize the (defunct) Soviet
Union but not Fidel Castro's decision to align the country on the USSR or to
mimic its policies. Errors can be “rectified” and some officials may be
removed from their positions. The top leadership/La Revolución is never
asked to pay for them.
The central role of the Cuban leadership and the Cuban Communist Party
(CPP) in providing politico-cultural orientation to the State, the mass organi-
zations and the Cuban nation is reiterated in all official documents directly
or indirectly concerning cultural policies in Cuba: the Constitution of 1976
(and its amended version in 1992); the “tesis and resoluciones” of five con-
gresses of the CCP concerning art, literature and culture; official declarations
during cultural events; speeches by Minister of culture Armando Hart (1976-
97) and his successor (Abel Prieto, 1997- ); and last but not least, speeches by
Fidel Castro, in particular his foundational Palabras a los intelectuales at the
National Library (June 1961) and his closing speech at the 1971 Congress on
Education and Culture. In most documents or proclamations on culture,
one finds the routine quotation from Fidel Castro or views explicitly drawn
from what Armando Hart once called “la sustancia del pensamiento de
Fidel” (Hart Dávalos, 1988: 3).
The dogma according to which La Revolución is an ongoing process or
movement is arguably the core of the master narrative. It is probably unique:
to my knowledge, leaders of countries in the Soviet bloc, China, North
Korea or Vietnam do not constantly refer to the government as “the revolu-
tion.” Mexicans “institutionalized” their revolution. Needless to explain, in
Cuba the revolutionary myth (following Mircea Eliade's definition: myth as
the “sacred history of origins”) has been a dominant feature of Cuban poli-
tics for a century. A truly radical (dare I say: “revolutionary?”) position in
Cuban politics would be to proclaim that the revolution is over, and that
other sources of legitimacy and meaning must be found. Interestingly, much
of the academic work on Cuba, including critical works from outside the
island, routinely fail to unpack this myth of revolution. Thus, a quick review
of scholarly publications reveals that political change in Cuba is usually con-
ceived as makeovers of the revolution, attempts to “reinvent revolution,” to
“make new revolutionary cultures,” to start a “second revolution,” and the