munist insurgents. Other governments, such as that of
China, which occupied Tibet and eastern Southeast
Asia, have actively persecuted Buddhism. Maoist ter-
rorists in Nepal have also targeted religion.
Communist China did not initially seek to wipe out
religion, but to wean people from it gradually as eco-
nomic and social reforms made the prop of religion
unnecessary. In fact, the 1949 constitution advocated
freedom of religious belief, and Buddhist institutions
were harnessed for welfare work and to educate so-
ciety about new government policies. The younger
generation of monks was particularly enthusiastic,
given that the highest ethical value of Buddhism—
compassion—could find expression in the ideals of
egalitarianism and social uplift, which communism
espoused.
Nevertheless, this cooperation with communism
undermined the distinctive features of most forms of
Buddhism. Monks and nuns had to abandon their tra-
ditional “unproductive” roles and undertake activities
that were traditionally prohibited for Buddhist monas-
tics, such as farm and factory work. Through the land
reform act of 1950, feudal land ownership was replaced
by communalization, and monasteries and nunneries
lost their sources of revenue. Monasteries were turned
into factories, communal food halls, military bases,
and government education centers. Furthermore, the
government made little distinction between “religion”
and “superstition” when attempting to suppress the
latter. Government-controlled Buddhist organizations
discouraged festivals, offerings to deities, and the burn-
ing of paper money for the deceased—all key features
of traditional Buddhism. The policy that loyalty to the
state was a higher value than religious belief meant that
religious activities could be discouraged as a hindrance
to productivity.
Moreover, measures taken to ensure that all religious
statements were in line with party politics eliminated
freedom of expression. The Communist government
monitored the recruitment of monks, and their free-
dom of movement, necessary for pilgrimage, was se-
verely restricted. In a short time, Buddhism was
effectively dismantled and transformed into an instru-
ment of the state. By the commencement of the Cul-
tural Revolution in 1966, any pretext of religious
tolerance was abandoned, and all personal or material
expressions of religion were outlawed and destroyed.
The enactment of these policies in Tibet moved at
a slower pace. Communist China’s 17-Point Plan, ne-
gotiated with Tenzin Gyatso, the fourteenth DALAI
LAMA, in 1950, protected religion and monasteries
from communalism, and China pursued a policy of
gradual transformation from the top, with the in-
volvement of highly esteemed Buddhist leaders. This
approach changed when Mao Zedong encouraged
rapid collectivization during the mid-1950s. Opposi-
tion to these reforms led to a bloody uprising involv-
ing monks from prestigious monasteries in Lhasa. The
Chinese army responded with force, the Dalai Lama
fled to India, and China abandoned its more lenient
policy on Tibet. Religious property was confiscated, re-
ligious buildings were destroyed, and monks and nuns
were imprisoned, disrobed, or put to alternative work.
Still, it was not until the Cultural Revolution that the
practice of Buddhism by individuals, so central to Ti-
betan culture, was banned outright in Tibet, as else-
where in China. After the late 1970s, Chinese policy
toward Tibetan Buddhism gradually softened in the
hope of persuading Tibetans to accept Chinese rule.
The failure of negotiations with the Tibetan govern-
ment in exile, however, has triggered a hardening of
control since the mid-1990s.
The Chinese pattern of initially using Buddhism for
its own ends, then suppressing it, has been mirrored
in other communist countries. The san ̇gha of Laos had
already become politicized, with French encourage-
ment, as part of its defense against the Japanese from
the 1920s until the1940s. When Laos was returned to
French colonial occupation in 1946, active members
of the Lao Issara, the national independence move-
ment, sought refuge in Thailand. The san ̇gha, mean-
while, could promote anticolonial sentiment as an
aspect of Buddhist teaching, while also collecting funds
for Lao Issara under the cover of the traditional dona-
tions given to temples on holy days. After indepen-
dence, the royalist government of Laos formed a
coalition with the Marxist party, the Pathet Lao, in- The Pathet Lao then negotiated the Ministry of
Religious Affairs as one of its portfolios, allowing the
Pathet Lao to further politicize the san ̇gha in its favor.
Monastic teachings reach all levels of society, and
the infiltration of the san ̇gha by Pathet Lao cadres was
relatively straightforward because of the tradition of
unrestricted ordinations. Those seeking ordination
often came from the same groups most susceptible to
Marxist ideology: young men from relatively poor
rural backgrounds, who traditionally sought ordina-
tion as a means of education and social advancement,
but who were excluded from the secular education
and economic development experienced by the urban
elite. When the royalist government responded by
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