of a great man, rule in accordance with dharma, and
preside over an age of peace. Buddhist rulers have
claimed the right to purify the religion and to judge
the teachings. In China, the emperor presided over de-
bates between representatives of Buddhism, Daoism,
and Confucianism, pronouncing the winner at the end
of the day. Various state laws provided some legal
backing, such as tax exemptions, to monastic institu-
tions. Conceding that the ruler has a legitimate role to
play in reducing the bad karma of crime, the san ̇gha
has performed rituals to protect the ruler and the state.
Many rulers in Asia, even pro-Buddhist rulers,
have sought to control aspects of the san ̇gha. Taking
on the role of the cakravartin, rulers have at times
“purged” the san ̇gha of its “impurities” by enforcing
stricter controls on entry (quotas on ordinations, or
added stipulations), by extending secular law into the
jurisdiction of the VINAYA(monastic code), and by
expelling certain monks and nuns. In some cases,
then, attacks on clerical institutions have been
phrased in pro-Buddhist terms. In other cases, there
was no such rationalization and the goal was simply
the extermination of the san ̇gha. Such violent anti-
clerical PERSECUTIONS have occurred sporadically
throughout history, but perhaps the best known in-
clude the persecution during the Huichang period in
China (ca. 842–845), the Communist-inspired icono-
clasm of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–
1976), and the violence in Tibet since the 1950s. In
Japan, the slaughter of monks during the civil warfare
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the
anti-Buddhist movements of the early Meiji (1868–
1870s), come to mind.
The ideal ruler is a lavish patron, funding monastery
construction and large publication projects. Many
rulers in Asia have indeed donated land and other
wealth for the establishment of monasteries, with a va-
riety of motives. Undoubtedly the popular perception
of the ruler as pious, the complicity of the monastic
institutions in state propaganda, and the conspicuous
displays of wealth all helped to legitimate the reign.
The doctrine of merit (Sanskrit, punya; Chinese,
gongde) made economic wealth religiously significant,
as donations became the very substance of the san ̇gha.
The construction of large Buddha images, such as the
colossal Buddha at Todaiji in Nara, dedicated in 752
C.E., was also a powerful means of asserting political
jurisdiction. The Todaiji image was built from dona-
tions gathered throughout the imperial domain, and
in both its material contributions and its iconographic
symbolism, consolidated the sense of a unified impe-
rial nation.
The imperial states of Asia were often intimately
involved in the process of importing the dharma.
Even when the state ideology was non-Buddhist or
anti-Buddhist in orientation, rulers made donations
out of political expediency, and many officials of the
state were committed to Buddhism in a “private” ca-
pacity. Imperial women in particular were often spon-
sors of Buddhism.
Monks were sometimes desirable subjects for rulers.
The great translator of Sanskrit texts, KUMARAJIVA
(350–ca. 409/413), was one of the spoils of war in
conflicts between Chinese and Central Asian states.
Well-traveled monks lent prestige and foreign intel-
ligence to a regime; they also embodied a certain mag-
ical auspiciousness. According to the account by
XUANZANG(ca. 600–664) of his travels to India, rulers
of the kingdoms he passed through often wanted him
to stay. King Harsha (r. 606–647) paid his respects to
Xuanzang, convened a debating tournament and de-
clared him the winner, and released him only after
much delay. When Xuanzang returned to China, he
was welcomed by Emperor Gaozong (r. 649–683),
who attempted to press the monk into political ser-
vice. Failing that, he urged Xuanzang to record his
travels.Buddhism as a political problem
Buddhism has at times been perceived as a political
danger. Various versions of millennial Buddhism have
been seen as challenges to the state, and in some cases
truly were. The idea of the DECLINE OF THE DHARMA
(also known by the Japanese term mappo) described
the declining, or degenerating, capacity of human be-
ings to achieve enlightenment as they grew increas-
ingly remote from S ́akyamuni Buddha. Various time
frames were projected, with most orthodox estimates
placing the decisive “end of the dharma” in the dis-
tant future. However, some popular millennial move-
ments have posited the arrival or imminence of the
end. In some cases Buddhists concluded that FAITHin
AMITABHABuddha was the only viable option in such
a degenerate age, but in other cases it was believed that
the messianic figure MAITREYAwas present or soon
would be present.
Mappoassumed political importance both as a cri-
tique of government, since corrupt government was
one indication of the decline, and also as an element
of movements actively opposing the state. Though or-POLITICS ANDBUDDHISM