means desiring something. Physically, linguistically, or
mentally, we try to “get it.” Stated another way, only
cognitive acts can have karmic repercussions. This
would include meaningful bodily gestures that com-
municate intentions (such gestures are also called
vijñapti). Since Buddhists seek to overcome ignorance
and suffering by eliminating karmic conditioning,
Buddhists need focus only on what occurs within the
domain of cognitive conditions (cittagocara). Cate-
gories such as external object and materiality (rupa)
are cognitive constructions. Materialityis a word for
the colors, textures, sounds, and so on that we cognize
in acts of perception, and it is only to the extent that
they are perceived and ideologically grasped, thereby
becoming objects of attachment, that they have karmic
significance. There is nothing intrinsically good or bad
about gold, for example; rather our ideasabout gold’s
value and uses, which we project and then act upon,
lead to good or bad consequences. Materialism is not
the problem. The incessant propensity (anus ́aya) to
appropriate (upadana) what consciousness projects is
the problem. These projections are not just things, but
moral qualities, status, ideals, religious and national
doctrines and identities, the holdingof opinions, what-
ever we can make our own, or make ourselves to be.
A deceptive trick is built into the way consciousness
operates at every moment. Consciousness constructs a
cognitive object in such a way that it disowns its own
creation, pretending the object is “out there,” in order
to render that object capable of being appropriated.
Even while what we cognize is occurring within our
act of cognition, we cognize it as ifit were external to
our consciousness. Realizing vijñaptimatrameans ex-
posing this trick at play in every act of consciousness,
catching it in the act, as it were, and thereby eliminat-
ing it. Consciousness engages in this deceptive game
of projection, dissociation, and appropriation because
there is no “self.” The deepest-seated erroneous view
to which SENTIENT BEINGScling, according to Bud-
dhism, is atmadrsti,the view that a permanent, eter-
nal, immutable, independent self exists. No such self
exists, and deep down we know that. This makes us
anxious, since it entails that no self or identity endures
forever. In order to alleviate that anxiety, we attempt
to construct a self, to fill the anxious void, to do or ac-
quire something enduring. The projection of cognitive
objects for appropriation is consciousness’s main tool
for this construction. If I own things (ideas, theories,
identities, material objects), then “I am.” If there are
eternal objects that I can possess, then I too must be
eternal. To undermine this erroneous appropriative
grasping, Yogacara texts say: Negate the object, and the
self is also negated (e.g., Madhyantavibhaga,1:4, 8).Intentional acts also have moral motives and con-
sequences. Since effects are shaped by their causes, an
act with a wholesome intent would tend to yield whole-
some fruits, while unwholesome intentions produce
unwholesome effects.Three natures (trisvabhava)
Yogacara devised a model of three self-natures
(trisvabhava) to explain vijñaptimatramore concisely.
The pervasive mental constructions that obstruct our
view of what truly is the case are called parikalpita
(imaginative construction). The actual webs of causes
and conditions at play are called paratantra(depen-
dent on other [causes]). Other-dependence is so-called
to emphasize that no thing exists as an independent,
eternal self; everything arises dependent on causes and
conditions other than itself, in the absence of which it
ceases to be. Ordinarily paratantrais infested with
parikalpita. Parinispanna(consummation) is the re-
moval of parikalpitafrom paratantra,leaving only pu-
rified paratantra.Since the notion of “self-nature” is itself a parikalpic
idea that presumes self-hood, it too must be elimi-
nated. Thus the three self-natures are actually three
non-self-natures (tri-nihsvabhava). Parikalpitais de-
void of self-nature since it is unreal by definition.
Paratantralacks self-nature, since other-dependence
precludes “self” nature. Parinispanna—the Yogacara
counterpart to the Madhyamaka notion of s ́unyata
(emptiness), which stands for the lack of self-nature in
everything—is the antithesis of self-nature. Thus the
three self-natures are ultimately understood as three
non-self-natures.Eight consciousnesses
Prior to Yogacara, Buddhists discussed six types of
consciousness: the five sensory consciousnesses (visual,
auditory, gustatory, olfactory, and tactile) and mental
consciousness (manovijñana). The consciousnesses
were said to be produced by contact between a sense
organ (e.g., the eye) and its corresponding sense field
or objects (e.g., colors, shapes). The mind (manas) op-
erated like the other senses, mental consciousness aris-
ing from the contact between manas and mental
objects (thoughts, ideas), though it could think about
what the other senses perceived, while the five senses
could not cognize each other’s objects. Yogacara found
this theory sound but inadequate because it did not ex-YOGACARASCHOOL