18 Leaders TheEconomistNovember13th 2021
S
cares abouttoxicdebtareaneverpresentfeatureofChina’s
economy. The latest involves Evergrande, a troubleddevelop
er that threatens to cripple the property sector. Thefirmalsohas
tentacles that reach into the darkest corners oftheChinesefi
nancial system, wrapping around banks and shadowlenders.
Yet even as Evergrande catches the eye, another riskisemerging:
crony capitalism at smaller banks.
A government crackdown on leverage in propertyhaspushed
Evergrande to the brink of collapse. Other largedevelopersare
weighed down by $5trn of debts. Speculation is swirlingthatone
of them, Kaisa, is also struggling to make payments(ithasasked
investors for “time and patience”). The turmoil mayintensifyas
more debts come due. According to Nomura, a
Japanese bank, the property industry must re
pay $20bn of offshore bonds in the first quarter
of 2022, twice the level of this quarter.
Foreign investors have been quick to grasp
the risks. The yield on Chinese junk dollar
bonds has reached a crippling 24%, shutting
most issuers out of the market. Some home
buyers are holding off purchases, worried about
handing over deposits to weak firms. Building has stalled at ma
ny of Evergrande’s 1,000 or more projects.
It is unclear who is exposed to losses, and to what extent. Ma
ny developers use shell companies, masking their debts, while
stockmarket regulators have allowed them to keep investors in
the dark. On November 8th the Federal Reserve warned that Chi
na’s property troubles threaten the global economy.
Losses on property loans will hurt the banking system, al
though by how much remains to be seen. But as we explain this
week (see Finance & economics section), lenders also face an
other danger. Crony capitalism has flourished among the coun
try’s small and midtier banks. Because the biggest stateowned
lendersprefertomakeloanstootherstatefirms,privatecom
paniesandentrepreneurshaveboughtstakesinbanksinthe
hopeofgettingpreferentialaccesstocredit.
Althoughthebanksinvolvedareoftensmalltheyadduptoa
giantproblem.TheEconomistcalculatesthatupto20%ofthe
commercialbankingsystemmayhavecloselinkswithtycoons
orprivatebusinesses.Therehavealreadybeenblowups.In 2019
thecollapseofa smalllendercauseda spikeininterbankbor
rowingrates;severalmorefailureshavefollowed.Evergrande
wasuntilrecentlytheownerofa captivebankinnortheastChi
naandissaidtobeunderinvestigationforsome100bnyuan
($15.7bn)inrelatedpartydeals.
ForXiJinping,China’sleader,statecontrolis
theanswertoboththepropertyandbanking
threats.Tokeepbuildingsitestickingover,lo
calgovernmentsaretakingcontrolofsomeun
finishedprojects.Atsmallerbanksmanycor
porateshareholdersarebeingforcedoutandre
placedbylocalgovernmentassetmanagers.
ThisrevealsthelimitationsofMrXi’seco
nomic philosophy. The expanding reach of
state control may prevent a fullblown panic, because it shows
that almost all banks are underwritten by the government. But it
fails to acknowledge an important truth about the economy.
Many of the distortions that plague China’s markets were
created by rigid state control. In plenty of private firms, insider
dealing with lenders has been a way to cope with a statedomin
ated banking system that discriminates against them. Mr Xi may
succeed in averting a sudden baddebt crisis by reasserting state
authority. But his reluctance to be bound by rules, treat state and
private firms equally, and offer predictability to investors will
ensure that the financial systemisdoomed to suffer yet more
dangerous distortions in the future.n
Evergrande is not the onlyloomingdangerinthemainland’sfinancialsystem
High-yield dollar-bond spread
China, percentage points
20
10
0
19182017 2120
China’s other debt problem
Evergrande and financial contagion
O
n november 8 ththe World Food Programme (wfp), a un
agency, said that its estimate of people “teetering on the
edge of famine” worldwide had risen from 42m earlier this year
to 45m. Remarkably, just one country accounts for almost all
those 3m additional people. Afghanistan is on the brink of a
humanitarian catastrophe.
Some 23m Afghans, in a country of 38m, face acute hunger. Of
those, 8.7m are in a state of emergency, the secondhighest cat
egory in the wfp’s hierarchy of calamity. The classification man
ual explains that by the time the agency declares a famine, the
highest category, it will be too late to avert the worst con
sequences “because many will have died”.
Many are dying already. More than 3m children are malnour
ished. Locals report cases of entire families starving to death in
their homes. Hospital wards are taking in emaciated children,
including 11yearolds who weigh just 13kg. Poor Afghans are
selling their remaining possessions for food. Some are selling
their daughters. The misery is as bad in the cities as it is in the
countryside. As the winter sets in, the agony will only deepen.
Afghanistan’s condition was fragile even before the fall of the
capital, Kabul, in August. Long periods of belowaverage rainfall
and aboveaverage temperatures have led to poor harvests and
high prices. After decades of warfare, around 4m Afghans are
refugees in their own country, with little means of support.
The Taliban takeover has made everything worse. Foreign
aid, which funded threequarters of government spending, has
The world must act now to stop Afghans starving
War, drought, famine
Afghanistan