The Economist - USA (2021-11-13)

The Economist November 13th 2021 BriefingRussianrepression 29

Echoes of that era are also to be found in
Russia’s  official  rhetoric  of  ressentiment
and imperial nationalism. They can be re­
cognised in media images of the male body
beautiful,encouraging healthy living, and
in  laws  against  homosexual  propaganda.
They  were  voiced  in  a  recent  speech  by
Vladimir  Putin,  Russia’s  president,  extol­
ling the country’s “spiritual values and his­
torical traditions” and denouncing the de­
cadence  of  Western  liberalism.  Mr  Putin
took the opportunity to praise Ivan Ilyin, a
philosopher  who  in  the  1920s  embraced
Italian fascism as a model for Russia. 

Sitting pretty
For  much  of  his  rule,  Mr  Putin  was  more
readily associated with kleptocracy, fakery
and cynicism than with a coherent ideolo­
gy  which  inserted  the  state  deep  into
everyday  life.  During  his  first  decade  in
power,  the  2000s,  economic  growth—
much of it to the benefit of his friends and
former  kgb colleagues,  but  significant
amounts enjoyed more broadly—provided
more  or  less  all  the  support  his  regime
needed.  In  his  second  decade,  when
growth  faded  and  protests  broke  out  in
large  cities,  nationalist  propaganda  and
anti­Americanism  became  more  preva­
lent. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and
the  war  in  Ukraine  kept  people  enter­
tained, excited and on­side. There was re­
pression,  but  Russia’s  ruling  elite  was
more  interested  in  wealth  than  violence.
Literary­minded Russians could take com­
fort  in  lines  from  “Letters  to  a  Roman
Friend”  a  poem  by  Joseph  Brodsky:  “You
are  saying  procurators  are  all  looters,  But
I’d rather choose a looter than a slayer.” 
Mr Putin’s regime is now rendering that
distinction moot. As Alexei Navalny, an op­
position  leader  poisoned  in  August  2020
and jailed this year, recently wrote from his
prison cell: “An official taking a bribe and a
policeman pulling a bag over the head of a
prisoner  tied  to  a  chair  are  one  and  the
same person. His law is the superiority of
the  strong  over  the  weak.  The  superiority
of  the  interests  of  a  corporation  over  the
rights of an individual. The willingness to
commit crimes as an act of loyalty.” 
Grigory  Okhotin  of  ovd­Info,  a  media
and human­rights organisation that moni­
tors political repression and provides legal
help to its victims, notes ashift in the gov­
ernment’s  tactics.  Once  it  wanted  to  con­
tain,  and  by  doing  so  deter,  political
threats.  Now  it  wants  to  eliminate  them.
Political  power  has  shifted  from  civilian
technocrats  to  militarised  and  often  uni­
formed  “securocrats”  happier  with  vio­
lence. The regime has moved from being a
consensual autocracy supported by co­op­
tion and propaganda to a dictatorship rest­
ing on repression and fear. 
This  aspect  of  Mr  Putin’s  power  has
deep roots. In 2015 it claimed the life of Bo­

ris Nemtsov, aliberal oppositionpoliti­

cian.Havingwarnedofthelethaldangerof

MrPutin’scorruptionhewassubjectedtoa

hatecampaignbeforebeingshotdeadona

bridgenexttotheKremlin.Butsincethe

summerof 2020 ithasbeenappliedmore

widely.Accordingtoa pollbytheLevada

Centre,alsoa “foreignagent”,thefearofre­

pression,nowsharedby52%ofRussia’s

population,andofstateviolence(58%),are

at all­time historicpeaks, trumpingthe

fearoflosinga job,fallingintopovertyor

beingstruckbynaturaldisaster.

Politicshasbeenbanned.MrNavalny’s

organisation has been crushed and de­

clared “extremist”. His entire team has

beenforcedoutofthecountry;theirre­

mainingrelativesareharassedandperse­

cuted.ThefatherofIvanZhdanov,oneof

MrNavalny'sright­handmen,wasputon

trialinOctober.OnNovember9thLiliya

Chanysheva,a 39­year­oldpoliticianwho

ranoneofMrNavalny’sregionaloffices,

was arrested on a retroactively applied

chargeof“extremism”.Shecouldfaceten

yearsinjail.

OpenRussia,a pro­democracyorgani­

sationfundedbyMikhailKhodorkovsky,a

formerbillionaireoncejailedandsinceex­

iled,hasbeendeclared“undesirable”and

forcedtoclose.Itsformerboss,AndreiPi­

vovarov,isfacingsixyearsinjailforFace­

bookposts.Thousandsaredeniedtheright

to stand for electionbecause ofreal or

imaginedassociationwithMrNavalny—as

are9mpeople(8%oftheelectorate)with

previouscriminalrecordsordualcitizen­

ship,accordingtoGolos,anelection­mon­

itoringoutfitthatisalsoa “foreignagent”.

OneexampleisViolettaGrudina,who

onceworkedforMrNavalnyinMurmansk,

anArcticport,andwhoisprofiledina film

producedbyTheEconomistandHardcash

Productions (see economist.com/russia­

film).AfterMrNavalny’sorganisationwas

banned,shedecidedtostandasaninde­

pendentcandidateinlocalelections.Her

officewasvandalised,shewasforcedintoa

covidhospital,andthendisqualifiedfor

beingpartofan“extremistorganisation”.

Thecrackdownhasnotbeenasharshas

somebeforeit.Theregimehasnotusedle­

thalforce—atleastnotinitsownname.

Manyhavebeenallowed—indeedencour­

aged—toleavethecountry.Thisisnota liq­

uidation,norisita tyrannybuiltona cult

ofpersonality.Ratheritissomethingcob­

bledtogethertoretainpowerinthefaceof

fallingpopularityanderodedlegitimacy.It

issimilarinkind,ifnotyetinresistance

andviolence,tothatofAlexanderLukash­

enkoinneighbouringBelarus.Itdoesnot

thriveonmassmobilisationandhysteria.

Itsaimistosuppresscrowdsnotexcite

them.Itneitherinspiresnorrequiresen­

thusiasminthemasses.

Maybethistime

Justaswell.MrPutin’saccesstothemasses

isnottheeasymatteritoncewas.Hewas

broughttopowerbytelevision,whichthen

helpedhim consolidatehiscontrol.The

publicwasdependentonthemediumthat

hemonopolised.Anything thatwas not

televised did not exist, which was bad

news for opposition figures. And that

whichdidnotexistcouldstill,whennec­

essary,betelevised—asinthecaseofUk­

rainian“fascists”inCrimea.

Theriseofthesmartphonechangedall

that.By2018,80%ofthepopulationwas

usingtheinternetand82%of18­to44­

year­oldswerewatchingYouTube.Accord­

ingtoa recentreportbyLiberalMission,a

think­tank, the share of tv, radio and

newspapersinoverallmediaconsumption

hasshrunk from70%to 45% sincethe

mid­2010s,whileonlinesources’sharehas

grownfrom18%to45%(seechart1).

Inthesameperiod,trustinMrPutin

hasfallenfrom60%to30%.Inthe2000s

membersoftheyoungergenerationwere

amongMrPutin’smostloyalsupporters.

Thathasnowbeenreversed(seechart2),

andnotjustbecauseofinternetaccess.The

young feel more disgust at corruption,

which deprives them of prospects, and

havea morepositiveviewofEuropeand

America.Theyresentthestate’sincreasing

intrusionsintotheirlivesandtheyvalue

human rights. But theinternet has un­

doubtedly helped cementthose feelings

Losing that loving feeling

Russia, trust in Vladimir Putin by age group, %

Sources:LevadaCentre;Rogov,“TheYear

ofNavalny ”,LiberalMission

2

55+

40-54

25-39

1   -24

Allages

200 40 60 80

2015 average January 2020 to May 2021, average

The grapevines

Russia, news consumption by source

% responding

Sources:LevadaCentre;Rogov,“TheYear

ofNavalny ”,LiberalMission

1

50

40

30

20

10

0

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