The Economist November 13th 2021 39
The Americas
Howtobea dictator(1)
By the book
“I
don’t seehow Nicolás Maduro has the
capacity to stay for an extended time
in government,” said Henrique Capriles, a
former presidential candidate, in 2013. “It’s
near the end for Maduro,” concluded Ian
Bremmer, a political scientist, in 2017. “Ma
duro’s days are numbered,” promised Mike
Pompeo, then the United States’ secretary
of state, in 2019.
Venezuela’s president has had the satis
faction of proving them all wrong. Mr Ma
duro’s demeanour during broadcasts on
statetv these days is one of avuncular
calm. In October he took viewers on a tour
of the presidential palace to show off gar
ish Christmas decorations. “How cute!” he
exclaimed, as he pointed at a plastic deer.
Such festive cheer is rare outside the
palace. Mr Maduro has overseen one of the
worst recessions in world history. Under
his incompetent management, Venezue
la’s economy has shrunk by 75%. Some 6m
people have emigrated: more than a fifth of
the population. If fair elections for presi
dent were held, it is almost inconceivable
that he would win. His support in opinion
polls hovers near 15%. But Mr Maduro
doesn’t let the little people tell him what to
do. Over the past five years his regime has
turned from somewhat authoritarian to
blatantly so. When Venezuelans go to the
polls for municipal elections on November
21st, it is highly unlikely that the opposi
tion—who, for a change, are taking part—
will get very far. Here are six steps Mr Ma
duro has taken on the path to autocracy.
Step by step
Most importantly, he has continued and
extended the subversion of institutions
that began under his predecessor, Hugo
Chávez, who was president from 1999 to
- After Mr Maduro’s United Socialist
Party lost control of parliament in 2015 (in
what most observers rate as the last re
motely fair election), various measures
were put in place to stop the opposition
from achieving anything. The Supreme
Court was stuffed with loyalist judges. In
2017 the elected parliament was dissolved
and replaced with a rubberstamp constit
uent assembly. The parliament was later
reestablished, with a socialist majority,
after an unfair election. The electoral au
thority which oversaw all these changes is
flagrantly biased.
Meanwhile, the regime has tightened
its grip on broadcast media. Private chan
nels are run by people who sympathise
with the regime or who have decided to toe
the line. The government has closed down
almost all newspapers. Opposition parties
are meant to be given equal access to the
media ahead of elections, such as those in
November, but in practice they are almost
completely excluded. An analysis of recent
coverage by the main stateowned televi
sion channel found that the opposition
was not mentioned at all on three of the
nine days examined. The rest of the time it
is referred to only briefly and disparaging
ly, as “radical” or “extreme”. Several web
sites that are critical of Mr Maduro’s re
gime are blocked.
Having inherited his job from a military
man who was both the perpetrator (in 1992)
and target (in 2002) of attempted coups, Mr
Maduro is keen to avoid any similar un
pleasantness. Chávez, while president,
C ARACAS
Six ways Nicolás Maduro has subverted democracy in Venezuela
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