The Economist November 13th 2021 Middle East & Africa 53
Iran’smilitarytactics
The new predators
U
singdronestoassassinatepeoplehas
longbeenthepreserveofthemostad
vanced armed forces,suchasAmerica’s
andIsrael’s.ButanattemptonNovember
7thtokillIraq’sprimeminister,Mustafaal
Kadhimi,wasa dramaticdemonstrationof
how such “precisionstrike” capabilities
arespreadingtolessadvancedcountries
andeventoshadowymilitias.
Several of Mr Kadhimi’s bodyguards
werehurtwhenatleastonedronehithis
homein the protected “Green Zone”of
Baghdad.Otherdronesmayhavebeenshot
down.The primeministersurvived, ap
pearingsoonafterwardsontelevisionto
denouncethe“cowardly”attack.
Thehitwassorudimentary,apparently
involvingquadcopters(ofthesortthatcan
beboughtbyhobbyists)riggedwithsmall
bombs,thatitcouldhavebeenstagedby
anyoneofIraq’smanyarmedgroups.“If
youcandeliverpizzawitha drone,youcan
dropa grenade,”saysJamesLewisofthe
Centre for Strategic and International
Studies,anAmericanthinktank.
YetsuspicionimmediatelyfellonIran
anditsproxies,fortworeasons.Thefirstis
thatFatah,thepoliticalarmofShiamili
tiasalignedwithIran,isfuriousatlosing
most of its seats in Iraq’s election last
month.Loyalistshavestagedprotestsand
onNovember5thattemptedtoburstinto
theGreenZone.Thefollowingday,atthe
funeralofaprotester killedby security
forces, militia leaders vowed revenge
againstMrKadhimi.
ThesecondreasonisthatIranhasbe
come the most assiduous provider of
drone technology to its proxies and
friends,notonlyinIraqbutalsoinLeba
non, Yemen, Syria and the Gaza Strip.
Thesearenotthesophisticatedmachines
operatedbyAmerica,suchasthePredator
andthe Reaper. Instead, theyare often
“craptastic”knockoffs,madewithcom
merciallyavailablecomponents,explains
AaronSteinoftheForeignPolicyResearch
Institute, another American thinktank.
ButIranisalsomakingimprovements,not
least by reverseengineering captured
drones,suchasAmerica’sstealthyrq170.
Likeunmannedaerialvehicles(uavs)
fromadvancedcountries,Iranianonesare
usedforbothsurveillanceandstrikes.Un
likethem,Iranianuavs donotusuallycar
ry precisionguided munitions. Instead
thedroneitselfistheguidedbomb,flying
intothetargetanddetonatinglikea robot
ic kamikaze. Iran dispenses with the satel
lite links that allow Western forces to con
trol drones from the other side of the
world. Its uavs are typically operated by
lineofsight radio control, or can guide
themselveswithgpstechnology used in
smartphonesandautomotive satnavs.
Iranachievesgreat range by distribut
inguavs (orthetechniques to make them)
toitsalliesacrossthe Middle East, thereby
threatening targets from the Mediterra
neantothePersian Gulf. The drones are of
tendeliveredinkits and assembled locally
withlittlehelpfrom Iran, notes Mr Stein.
“Thesedronesallow Iran to orchestrate at
tacks whilemaintaining deniability and
ambiguity,”saysan Israeli military official.
Thesimplicitybelies the threat that the
dronespose.Lastmonth an American out
postinTanfinSyria was hit by five gps
guided drones. Nobody was hurt, but
Americanofficials later blamed Iran and
theBidenadministration imposed sanc
tionsonpeopleand firms associated with
the drone programme. In 2019 several
dronesstruckSaudi Arabia’s oil facilities at
Abqaiq and Khurais, interrupting about
halfofthecountry’s oil output for a while.
TheHouthimilitia in Yemen, which is al
liedtoIranandhas been fighting against a
Saudiledcoalition since 2015, claimed re
sponsibility.ButWestern military sources
believethedrones were dispatched from
Iraq,orperhapseven from Iran.
Israelpioneered the use of disposable,
selfdestructingdrones to destroy Arab air
defences in the 1970s and 1980s. Now,
though,itmustward off the drones of its
enemies.It hasresorted to everything from
F16fighterstothe Iron Dome antirocket
system,butislooking for a better defence.
SoisAmerica.“We no longer have air supe
riority,” laments an American military
source,referringto the Middle East.“Amer
icansgotusedtoowning the skies.”n
J ERUSALEM AND WASHINGTON, DC
Why drones are becoming Iran’s
weapon of choice
Up to no good
Congo’smilitias
No farewell
to arms
A
t the entrance to a base for exrebels
in Mubambiro, a town in the east of the
Democratic Republic of Congo, a young
man paces to and fro, clasping a wooden
replica of an ak47, the rifle of choice for
guerrillas everywhere. “I am the guard
here,” he explains, “And I am used to hav
ing a gun, it makes me feel comfortable.”
Shukuru Bijadunia, aged 23, handed his
real rifle to the Congolese authorities in
2018 and has languished in a dismal camp
ever since. He sleeps without a mattress in
a shabby tent with other former rebels. Last
year no food was provided at the camp for
nine months. “I sleep badly, I barely eat
and there is no medicine when we get
sick,” says Mr Bijadunia. “Life in the bush
was better.” Hundreds of other former re
bels agree. At its peak, the camp hosted
more than 1,700 fighters, from 30 different
militias, who had surrendered. Today, few
er than 400 of them remain. Some have
gone back into the bush to rejoin their old
armed groups. Others have been recruited
into new ones.
Conflict has ravaged eastern Congo for
over 25 years. More than 120 armed groups
hide in the forests. Many are reportedly
backed by Uganda and Rwanda, though
both countries deny this. Militias that had
surrendered or disbanded are regrouping,
and new ones are forming. Some groups
say they want to overthrow the president,
Félix Tshisekedi, though he is usually more
than 1,000km (621 miles) away in the capi
tal, Kinshasa. In the meantime, many prey
on local civilians or smuggle minerals.
On November 7th gunmen attacked two
villages near the Ugandan border, killing
Congolese soldiers. The attackers are be
lieved to be members of the m23, a militia
backed by Rwanda that in 2012 captured
Goma, a city of 2m people, before being de
feated and forced to surrender a year later
by unforces and the Congolese army. Now
it seems to have reassembled. The Ameri
can embassy recently warned its citizens
in Goma to stay at home, fearing another
attack on the city.
Also this month, members of a new
group calling for Mr Tshisekedi to step
down stormed the city of Bukavu. The at
tacks highlight the president’s failure to
make good on one of his main campaign
promises before he came to power in
2019—to pacify the eastern parts of Congo.
On his first presidential visit to the embat
tled province of North Kivu, Mr Tshisekedi
MUBAMBIRO
The president does not know what to
do with rebels who surrender