The Economist November 13th 2021 Business 69
W
henberndosterloh, the
mightybossofVolkwagen’scoun
cilthatrepresentsworkers,announced
hisresignationinAprilmanyinvestors
breatheda sighofrelief.Frequent,
acrimoniousclashesbetweenhimand
HerbertDiess,thegroup’snoless
mightychiefexecutive,hadbecomea
distractionfromthebigchangesre
quiredtopushvwintotheelectricage.
TheculminationwasMrOsterloh’s
attempttotoppleMrDiess.
Yetonlysixmonthsafterthedepar
tureofhisnearnemesisMrDiessis
againlockinghornswithlabourrepre
sentatives.Thistimeobserverssaythe
brashBavarianmayhavegonetoofar.
Afterall,Volkswagen’sworkershave
enormousclout.Theirrepresentatives
occupyhalftheseatsonthegroup’s
20membersupervisoryboard.They
cancountontheloyaltyofthetwo
boardrepresentativesofLowerSaxony,
thewesternGermanstatethatownsa
fifthofvw. TheVolkswagenlawfrom
1960 thatlimitsvotingrightsofany
shareholderto20%givesLowerSaxony
a defactovetoonanybigdecision.
Howdidtherelationshiphitbottom
soquickly?Thebiggestboneofconten
tionistheextentofchangesrequiredto
enablevwtorivalTeslaasa leading
makerofelectriccars.Inanemailthat
wasleakedtotheworkscouncil,Mr
Diesssuggestedcutting30,000jobs,
whichwouldmostlyaffectthebloated
bureaucracyatvw’s headquartersin
Wolfsburg.Yetjoblossesarelikelytobe
anunavoidablepartoftheelectric
vehicleage,becauseevstakelesstime
toassemblethancarswithinternal
combustionengines.Amidtheensuing
outcry,MrDiesstoneddownhisplans
forjobcuts.
Butthedamageisdone.A four
membermediationcommitteeisdis
cussingMrDiess’sfutureeventhough
hiscontractwasextendedto 2025 only
inJuly.Mostagreeheistherightmanto
steerchangeatvw,butsayhelacks
diplomacy.Variousnamesofpossible
successorsarecirculating.Tesla,of
course,facesnosuchheadwinds.Its
boss,ElonMusk,hasusedsocialmedia
towarnworkersagainstunionisation.
TheAmericanfirm,whichisbuildinga
gigafactorynotfarfromvw’shead
quarters,presumablyviewsGermany’s
systemofpowerfulworkerrepresenta
tiononboardsasa cautionarytale.
Volkswagen’slabourrelations
Golf ’s course
B ERLIN
Unionsandthebossareatitagain
GeneralElectric
Not so general
P
erhapsthemostremarkablecharac
teristic of General Electric (ge) over its
129year history has been how thoroughly
it reflected the dominant characteristics of
big American business. Most of its history
was a chronicle of boisterous expansion,
then globalisation—followed by painful
restructuring away from the nowunloved
conglomerate model. On November 9th
Lawrence Culp, its chief executive, an
nounced that gewould split its remaining
operations into three public companies.
Each of these entities will be large, es
sential and very modern. One will make jet
engines, which ge reckons already power
twothirds of all commercial flights. Its
power business will provide the systems
and turbines generating onethird of the
world’s electricity. The healthcare divi
sion will continue to be the backbone of
modern hospitals. Yet it speaks to ge’s re
markable role that this is a modest reach
given its past sprawl. From the late19th to
the late20th century its products lit dark
streets; provided the toasters, fans, refrig
erators, and televisions (along with the sta
tions beamed to them), which transformed
homes; delivered the locomotives that
hauled trains; and then built a huge busi
ness financing all that and more.
The ambition to be everything was en
abled by the perception that it could man
age anything. The 21st century punctured
that perception. Jack Welch, an acquisitive
chief executive reputed to be a managerial
genius, retired in 2001 after receiving a
mindboggling $417m severance package.
Everbetter resultsduringhistenurebe
guiledinvestorsandsenttheshareprice
soaring. But problems soon arose. The
structureWelchleftbehindwasineffect
bailedoutduringthefinancialcrisis.Loss
esatgeCapital,thesprawlingfinancial
unithefostered,wereblamed,thoughthe
company’s industrialcore turnedout to
haveplentyofproblems,too.
Recentyearshavebeenspentspitting
out one notable businessafter another.
Thetimingofthebreakupannouncement
wasdeterminedbythesaleofa largeair
craftfinancing unit.The transaction re
duceddebtbyenoughtoprovidethethree
soontobe independentcompanieswith
an investmentgrade credit rating. Mr
Culp,thefirm’sbosssince2018,speaksof
the “illusory benefits ofsynergy” to be
tradedforthecertainbenefitsoffocus.“A
sharper purpose attracts and motivates
people,”hesays.
Having boasted of its management
nous,it nowseemsthatpoormanagement
iswhatdiditfora unifiedge.Thecontest
toreplaceWelchwaswidelyseenaspitting
thebestglobalexecutivesagainstonean
other,withthelosershiredtorunotherbig
firms.Buthissuccessorsstruggled.Jeffrey
Immelt, Welch’s handpicked replace
ment,retiredundera cloudin2017.John
Flannery,onceseenasa wizardbehindthe
riseofthehealthcaredivision,tookover
butwasfiredafterlittlemorethana year.
MrCulpwasbroughtinfromoutside,a
steplasttakeninthe19thcentury.
DuringmuchofWelch’stenureandits
immediate aftermath ge was the most
valuablecompanyintheworld,reachinga
peakmarketvaluenearlyfivetimesitscur
rent$121bn.Itistemptingtoconcludethat
ge’sfailureillustratesthedemiseofthe
conglomerate.Thatisrefutedbythediver
sificationoftoday’smostvaluablecompa
nies:techfirmsthathavebranchedoutin
todriverlesscars,cloudcomputingandso
on.Rather,ge’s storyreflectshoweventhe
mostvaluableAmericancompaniesmay
be flawed—andifflaws emerge,maybe
thoroughlytransformed.n
N EW YORK
An iconic conglomerate breaks up
And then there were three
Share prices, January 1973=100
Source:RefinitivDatastream
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2110200090801973
S&P 00
index
General
Electric
Jack Welch
CEO of GE